

# Beyond the Hump: Structural Change in an Open Economy

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## Abstract

This paper studies the role of trade and international borrowing in driving structural change. I decompose the change in manufacturing shares into three terms driven by (i) sectoral expenditure shares (what goods do agents buy?), (ii) trade shares (where do agents source these goods from?), and (iii) aggregate trade deficits (who borrows in a given period?), and map these into structural primitives in a calibrated quantitative model of trade with endogenous borrowing. Using data from twenty economies between 1965 and 2011, I show that trade specialization and international borrowing explain 40% of the average change in the manufacturing share, half of cross-country heterogeneity in the patterns of industrialization, half the dynamics in high-technology subsectors of manufacturing, and much of the China-driven deindustrialization and ‘miracle’ industrialization in South Korea. Thus, I argue that trade and international borrowing are indispensable for understanding structural change.

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# 1 Introduction

Structural change is the process of shifts in the sectoral composition of economies as they mature. Much has been written on its drivers in a closed economy (see Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2014)). But does openness matter for structural change? If so, is it openness to trade in goods, in assets, or both? Which countries have seen their manufacturing contract due to open economy forces, and which ones saw it grow? And how do we understand the cases of export-led industrialization (e.g. South Korea) and import-driven deindustrialization (e.g. so-called ‘China shock’)? In this paper I address these questions in a unified framework.

First, using an accounting identity, I show that changes in sectoral value added shares can be broken down into three terms that arise due to changes in (i) sectoral expenditure shares (what goods do agents buy?), (ii) trade shares (where do agents source these goods from?), and (iii) aggregate trade deficits (who borrows in a given period?). I interpret these three terms as capturing, respectively, the contribution of secular changes in sectoral demand, trade specialization, and international borrowing. The decomposition is model-free, and relies on observable data alone. Later on, I map the reduced-form terms of the decomposition into structural primitives using a calibrated quantitative model of trade with non-homothetic preferences and endogenous borrowing. The decomposition offers a simple way to evaluate the role of trade specialization and international borrowing in driving structural change.

Applying the decomposition to changes in manufacturing value added shares in twenty economies between 1965 and 2011, I show that trade specialization and international borrowing are quantitatively important drivers of structural change. Specifically, the two are responsible for 23% and 17% of observed changes in manufacturing shares in my sample. However, the level of disaggregation matters: taking the *composition* of manufacturing into account, I find that the relative importance of specialization increases to 31%. In other words, open economies specialize within manufacturing, in addition to specializing in manufacturing as a whole.

Second, I show that trade specialization and international borrowing are crucial drivers of the heterogeneity in countries' experiences of structural change. In particular, I find that trade specialization explains a quarter of the deviation of countries' change in manufacturing shares from the average for their income group. International borrowing explains a further quarter. Moreover, I argue that the push towards divergence is inherent to the operation of these two forces. When one economy specializes in manufacturing – its exports increase as a share of its trading partner's expenditures. On the flip side, its competitors, necessarily, de-specialize. In turn, economies that borrow see their non-tradables' shares expand. This effect is compositional: as borrowing domestic households increase their expenditure, non-tradable services expand to meet the demand. Tradable sectors, on the other hand, see their sales to domestic households increase, but the sales to rest of world contract as the foreign lenders temporarily cut expenditure. Thus, borrowing disproportionately props up the non-tradable sectors of the economy. And, since borrowing necessitates lending, by the same argument, lending economies see their tradables' share expand.

Finally, I show that subsectors within manufacturing follow very different dynamics. As economies mature, both the aggregate manufacturing and its low-technology subsectors' shares initially increase and then contract – exhibiting the co-called 'hump-shaped' pattern. The high-technology manufacturing, on the other hand, exhibits no such 'hump'. Applying the decomposition to the two subsectors separately reveals the origin of the discrepancy: whereas the low-technology subsectors are mainly driven by the secular changes in sectoral demand, the high-technology manufacturing is primarily shaped by specialization, with a handful of economies increasingly dominant.

The decomposition suggests that in order to understand structural change in open economies we need to take seriously the patterns of specialization within manufacturing and countries' engagement in international borrowing and lending. But what fundamental forces shape countries' specialization and borrowing behaviour? To address these questions, I turn to a structural model, extending a closed economy setup

of Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021) in two ways. First, I model manufacturing as a set of subsectors, each featuring a continuum of tradable varieties. Economies purchase varieties from the cheapest origin, giving rise to endogenous specialization subject to Ricardian comparative advantage. Second, households are forward looking and borrow and lend on international markets to smooth consumption subject to convex costs of imbalances. The model gives rise to a structural interpretation of the terms of the accounting decomposition as distinct mechanisms of structural change brought into motion by changes in technology and preferences. I use the calibrated version of the model to revisit two long-standing questions linking trade and structural change – the impact of China on the evolution of manufacturing sectors around the world, and the role of trade in the ‘miracle’ industrialization of South Korea.

I show that between 2000 and 2011, China has put a squeeze on the manufacturing shares of all economies in my sample. However, while trade specialization played an important role for a handful of economies, for others – including the United States – the main channel at play was, instead, borrowing. Inasmuch as large current account surpluses in China made borrowing in the rest of the world cheaper, this led to a global shift towards the production of non-tradables. In turn, I find that trade specialization was important for China’s effect on the *composition* of global manufacturing, pushing economies towards the production of low-technology varieties. Turning to South Korea, I show that trade specialization is the main force behind the doubling of its manufacturing share between 1965 and 2011. However, the aggregate conceals two distinct trends. First, trade cost declines prompted a dramatic reallocation of resources from the primary sector into the low-technology subsectors of manufacturing – mainly textiles. At the same time, South Korean productivity evolved, increasingly favouring high-technology sub-sectors – mainly electrical equipment – which drew on resources from the low-technology subsectors. Thus, the ‘miracle’ industrialization hinged crucially on the combined effect of trade liberalization releasing labour into the manufacturing, and shifting comparative advantage *within* it.

This paper is related to several strands in the literature. First – focusing on structural change – has mostly been analysed in a closed economy context. Ngai and Pissarides (2007) study the role of substitution across sectoral goods due to shifting relative prices (price effect), whereas Boppart (2014) and Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021) focus on the role of changes in expenditure shares due to non-homotheticities in consumer preferences (income effect). Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2021) and Garcia-Santana, Pijoan-Mas, and Villacorta (2021), in turn, emphasize the role of sectoral composition of investment in driving structural change. Recently, Huneus and Rogerson (2020) have used simulations to argue that the operation of price- and income effects in a closed economy environment is sufficient to explain much of cross-country heterogeneity in patterns of industrialization. Instead, I use a model-free accounting decomposition to show that changes in the sectoral expenditure shares – which nest both – explain only a half of the cross-country heterogeneity. In other words, ignoring openness to trade and borrowing risks overestimating the role of secular forces.

Structural transformation in an open economy, in turn, received relatively less attention. A number of papers leverage calibrated models of trade to study the importance of different drivers of structural change. Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013) and Kehoe, Ruhl, and Steinberg (2018) do so in the context of South Korea and United States. Świecki (2017) and a contemporaneous paper by Sposi, Yi, and Zhang (2021), instead, study structural change in a large sample of economies and consider the operation of multiple exogenous drivers. Additionally, the latter document a novel stylised fact: increase in the variance in manufacturing shares over time. Both find that imposing autarky leads to the deterioration of the fit between the model and the data and that, therefore, openness matters for structural change.

Instead, in this paper I show that the effect of openness is comprised of two distinct mechanisms: trade specialization and international borrowing. While the idea of (de)-industrialization due to shifts in comparative advantage is as old as

Ricardo, the quantitative importance of this mechanism, up until now, was unknown. In turn, the role of international borrowing in driving structural change { increasingly important in a world of tight financial integration { has been largely overlooked. The accounting decomposition allows me to measure the relative role of the two. I find that both margins are critical, explaining 40% of the average change in the manufacturing share, half of cross-country heterogeneity in the patterns of industrialization, and close to a half the churn within the aggregate manufacturing. Thus, I find that both trade and international borrowing are indispensable for understanding structural change.

Second, I contribute to a considerable literature building on the original Eaton and Kortum (2002) quantitative Ricardian model. First, I develop a novel way of calibrating trade costs and sectoral productivities that relies on trade flow data alone. This enables me to calibrate the model at a two-digit level of disaggregation { compared to the two- or three-sector models in prior literature { and thus move beyond the aggregate manufacturing, and towards dynamics within it. Second, while endogenous borrowing is increasingly used in quantitative trade models, international capital is typically assumed to be perfectly mobile. This results in a wedge between the model predictions, where fast growing economies are expected to be borrowing heavily, and the data, where they rarely do. Frictions to international capital mobility introduced in this paper successfully dampen the model-generated capital flows, while remaining highly tractable and amenable to the 'hat-algebra' representation commonly used in this literature. These two innovations enable me to study the newly documented aspects of structural change in open economies { intra-industry specialization and the role of international borrowing { using counterfactual simulations.

Finally, my analysis of the impact of China and industrialization in South Korea contributes to two well-established strands of literature. Much of the former has leveraged cross-regional heterogeneity in exposure to competition from China to identify impact (see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) for an overview). However,

within-country cross-regional studies miss the country-level impact by construction<sup>2</sup>. In comparison, general equilibrium setup used in this paper gives rise to country-level estimates of impact. Modelling the operation of multiple channels at the same time, in turn, enables me to contrast the effects of competition from China, which mainly affected the composition of manufacturing, with the operation of the borrowing channel { the key driver behind the China-driven deindustrialization for the majority of economies in my sample. Meanwhile, much of the analysis of the industrialization in South Korea has focused on the effect of industrial policies in promoting the expansion of heavy industries (see Lane (2022) for an overview). In this paper, I study the role of openness in driving South Korea's industrialization in a calibrated general equilibrium model, and uncover the complementary roles of trade liberalization and shifts in sectoral productivities in shaping the process.

Outline The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I develop a decomposition of changes in sectoral shares into contributions of secular changes in sectoral demand, trade specialization, and international borrowing. In Section 3, I present the model where the terms of the decomposition arise endogenously. In Section 4, I discuss the implementation of the decomposition and the calibration of the model. In Section 5, I discuss the drivers of structural transformation, whereas in Section 6 I focus on the cases of China and South Korea. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Accounting Decomposition

In this section, I show how to break down changes in manufacturing value added shares into three terms driven by secular changes in sectoral demand, trade specialization, and international borrowing, respectively. For ease of exposition, I begin by assuming that no intermediate inputs are used in production. I relax this assumption later on.

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2. Cross-regional studies identify the difference between affected and unaffected regions, but are silent on the general equilibrium effects common to both.

Derivation. Consider an economy that produces goods in sector  $k$ , with nominal sales denoted as  $Y_{ik}$ . Let  $j$  index the destination markets for  $i$ 's sales of sector  $k$  goods (inclusive of the domestic market) and let  $X_{jik}$  denote  $j$ 's demand for sector  $k$  goods produced in  $i$ . Then,

$$Y_{ik} = \sum_j X_{jik} :$$

Multiplying and dividing  $X_{jik}$ , first, by  $j$ 's total expenditure on sector  $k$  goods  $\sum_i X_{jik}$ , then by  $j$ 's total expenditure across sectoral goods  $\sum_{i;k} X_{jik}$ , and finally by  $j$ 's income  $Y_j$ ,  $X_{jik}$  can be rewritten as

$$X_{jik} = \frac{\sum_i X_{jik}}{\sum_{i;k} X_{jik}} \frac{\sum_{i;k} X_{jik}}{Y_j} Y_j = \theta_{jik} \phi_{jk} D_j Y_j :$$

Here,  $\theta_{jik}$  { the share of  $j$ 's consumption of sector  $k$  goods originating in  $i$  (trade share) } captures where the agents source the goods from,  $\phi_{jk}$  { sectoral expenditure share } captures what goods the agents buy, and  $D_j$  { aggregate trade deficit } captures borrowing/lending on international markets in a given period. Economies that spend in excess of their income ( $D_j > 1$ ) can only do so by running aggregate trade deficits, the reverse is true for economies with  $D_j < 1$ . Finally, observe that in an economy with no intermediate inputs use, income is simply the sum of its sales across all sectors:  $Y_j = \sum_k Y_{jk}$ . Plugging all in,

$$Y_{ik} = \sum_j \theta_{jik} \phi_{jk} D_j \sum_k Y_{jk} :$$

Consider the total derivative of sectoral sales with respect to the full set of changes in trade shares, sectoral expenditure shares and aggregate trade deficits. It is convenient to use changes with respect to level, so denote  $\tilde{x} = dx/x$ , where  $dx$  is an infinitesimal change. Then,

$$\tilde{Y}_{ik} = \sum_j \theta_{jik} \tilde{\theta}_{jik} + \tilde{\phi}_{jk} + \tilde{D}_j + \sum_k \theta_{jik} \phi_{jk} \tilde{Y}_{jk} ;$$



where  $x_{jik} = X_{jik} = Y_{ik}$  is country  $i$ 's sector  $k$  exposure to market  $j$ , and  $va_{ik} = \sum_k Y_{ik} / P_k$  is sector  $k$ 's share of the value added. In Appendix A.1 I show changes in sectoral sales can be collected on the left hand side, such that

$$Y_{ik} = \sum_j x_{jik} \tilde{y}_{jik} + \sum_j x_{jik} \tilde{y}_{jk} + \sum_j x_{jik}^D D_j = Y_{ik}(\dot{\gamma}) + Y_{ik}(\sim) + Y_{ik}(D);$$

where  $Y_{ik}(\cdot)$  terms are shorthand for the corresponding sums. Finally, since  $va_{ik} = \sum_n va_{in} Y_{in} / P_n$ , changes in value added shares can be decomposed analogously:

$$va_{ik} = va_{ik}(\dot{\gamma}) + va_{ik}(\sim) + va_{ik}(D):$$

Interpretation. I interpret  $va_{ik}(\dot{\gamma})$  as capturing the effect of trade specialization

$$va_{ik}(\dot{\gamma}) = \sum_j x_{jik} \tilde{y}_{jik} + \sum_n va_{in} \sum_j x_{jin} \tilde{y}_{jin} + \sum_j x_{jik} \overline{y_j}(\dot{\gamma}):$$

The direct effect (first two terms) is positive if either domestic or foreign households switch towards  $i$  as a supplier of sector  $k$  goods, and this effect is stronger than that in other sectors. Thus, its operation reflects specialization in production of given sectoral goods as compared to other producers and as opposed to production in other sectors. The indirect effect (last term), in turn, accounts for changes in countries' incomes due to shifting patterns of specialization, with the sign of the effect depending on the sector's exposure to a given market compared to the economy average. Sectors that are above average exposed to an economy that grew { expand.

I interpret  $va_{ik}(\sim)$  as capturing the effect of secular changes in sectoral demand

$$va_{ik}(\sim) = \sum_j x_{jik} \tilde{y}_{jk} + \sum_n va_{in} \sum_j x_{jin} \tilde{y}_{jn} + \sum_j x_{jik} \overline{y_j}(\sim):$$

The direct effect is positive if either domestic or foreign households switch their expenditures towards consumption of sector  $k$  goods. The indirect effect operates as before,

this time reflecting changes in incomes that arise due to shifts in spending patterns. I label the contribution of this effect 'secular' as it encompasses the sweeping, long-term changes in sectoral consumption shares typically associated with development.

Finally,  $va_{ik}(D)$  captures the effect of countries' international borrowing:

$$va_{ik}(D) = \sum_j x_{jik} \frac{D_j}{Y_j} + \sum_j x_{jik} \frac{Y_j}{Y_j} (D):$$

Suppose home increases its borrowing, so that  $D_i > 0$ , and let  $k$  be non-tradable.

Then,  $k$  is more exposed to domestic demand than an average sector in the economy:

$x_{ik} = 1 > \frac{D_i}{Y_i}$ . Thus, the direct effect of borrowing is positive for non-tradables. In essence, international borrowing temporarily alters the sectoral composition of demand for domestically produced goods: as borrowing domestic households increase their expenditure, non-tradable services expand to meet the demand. Tradable sectors, on the other hand, see their sales to domestic households increase, but the sales to rest of world contract as the foreign lenders temporarily cut expenditure. Thus, borrowing props up the non-tradable sectors of the economy at the expense of the tradables. International lending has the opposite effect. Finally, the indirect effect now reflects changes in countries' incomes due to shifts in international borrowing.

Intermediate inputs. In Appendix A.1 I show that breaking down the demand terms into final demand and intermediate inputs use across various sectors  $j \rightarrow k$ ,  $X_{jik} = X_{jik}^{FC} + \sum_n P_n X_{jink}^{II}$ , and further breaking down intermediate inputs use into a product of the trade share, intermediate inputs expenditure share, and sectoral sales such that  $X_{jink}^{II} = x_{jik} x_{jnk} Y_{jk}$  gives rise to a decomposition analogous to the one with no intermediate inputs, where the secular term of the decomposition now includes changes in both final and intermediate expenditure shares:

$$va_{ik} = va_{ik}(\gamma) + \sim va_{ik}(\delta, \sim) + va_{ik}(D): \quad [1]$$

Note that the decomposition is model-free and relies on observable data alone. Next, I interpret the reduced-form terms of the decomposition using a structural model.

### 3 Model

In this section, I first outline a Ricardian model of trade with non-homothetic preferences and endogenous borrowing, and then use it to give a structural interpretation to the terms of the decomposition developed in the previous section. Two points on notation are in order.

**Sectors:** there are  $I$  countries and  $K$  sectors in the model. In what follows, it is convenient to denote the first sector as  $P$  for primary goods and the last sector as  $S$  for services. The remainder of sectors  $2, \dots, K-1$ , are subsectors of manufacturing. When aggregated, these produce aggregate manufacturing bundles for final and intermediate use. Due to this layered structure, I will use indexes  $2, \dots, K-1$  when agents make decisions that involve aggregate sectors, and  $2, \dots, K-1$  when considering choices over different types of manufacturing. When discussing production, budgets and market clearing where no such distinction is necessary, I will be indexing sectors by  $k; n = 2, \dots, K-1$ .

**Timing:** the model is dynamic, where production and consumption evolve subject to changes in six types of exogenous processes, which include sectoral productivities, trade costs, household impatience, preference and production function shifters, and country populations. Households have perfect foresight of the future evolution of these variables. However, with the exception of the level of household expenditure, all variables are determined within a period. I thus suppress time indices where possible.

**Producers.** Each sector  $k$  in each country  $i$  can produce any of the continuum of varieties  $z \in [0, 1]$ . Firms produce varieties using a Cobb-Douglas production function using labour  $l_{ik}$  and intermediate inputs bundle  $m_{ik}$ , and are exogenously assigned a

productivity level  $a_{ik}(z)$ :

$$y_{ik}(z) = a_{ik}(z) \frac{l_{ik}(z)}{l_{ikl}}^{\sigma_{ikl}} \frac{m_{ik}(z)}{1}^{\sigma_{ikl}}; \text{ where } \sigma_{ikl} \in [0, 1]; \quad (1)$$

Intermediate input bundle,  $m_{ik}$ , is comprised of inputs from  $K$  sectors, which are combined using a nested constant elasticity of substitution production structure. The outer nest combines inputs from three aggregate sectors:

$$m_{ik}(z) = \left( \sum_s \frac{1}{\sigma_{iks}} m_{iks}(z)^{\sigma_{iks}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_{ikS}}}; \text{ where } \sigma_{ikS} \in [0, 1]; \quad (2)$$

The inner nest combines inputs from subsectors of manufacturing:

$$m_{ikM}(z) = \left( \sum_m \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikm}} m_{ikm}(z)^{\sigma_{ikm}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_{ikM}}}; \text{ where } \sigma_{ikM} \in [0, 1]; \quad (3)$$

Firm profits satisfy:

$$\pi_{ik}(z) = p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z) - w_l l_{ik}(z) - \sum_{n \in K} P_{in} m_{ikn}(z); \quad (4)$$

Assumption 1: the productivity level  $a_{ik}(z)$  is drawn, independently for each country, from a Fréchet distribution with the cumulative distribution function as follows:

$$F_{ik}(a) = \exp \left( - \frac{a^\kappa}{A_{ik}} \right); \quad \kappa = \frac{\sigma_{ik} + 1}{\sigma_{ik}}; \quad \sigma_{ik} \in (0, 1);$$

$A_{ik} > 0$  reflects the absolute advantage of country  $i$  in producing sector  $k$  goods: higher  $A_{ik}$  means that high productivity draws for varieties in  $i; k$  are more likely.  $\kappa > 1$  is inversely related to the productivity dispersion. If  $\kappa$  is high, productivity draws for any one country are more homogeneous.  $\sigma_{ik}$  is introduced to simplify the

3. As will be shown, the choice of the origin of a variety to be purchased will then be closely tied to the average productivity, costs of trade or costs of production in the exporter country. This

notation in the rest of the model<sup>4</sup>

Varieties can be shipped abroad with an iceberg cost  $\tau_{ijk}$  ( $\tau_{ijk}$  goods need to be shipped for one unit of good to arrive from  $j$  to  $i$ ; trade within an economy is costless:  $\tau_{iik} = 1$   $\forall i, k$ ). The final goods producer aggregates individual varieties into the sectoral good bundles in each economy using CES technology. Specifically,

$$Q_{ik} = \int_0^Z q_k(z)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_k}} dz^{\sigma_k}; \text{ where } q_k(z) = \sum_{j \in I} q_{jk}(z); \quad (5)$$

Final goods producer profits satisfy:

$$\pi_{ik} = P_{ik} Q_{ik} - \sum_{j \in I} \int_0^Z p_{jk}(z) q_{jk}(z) dz; \quad (6)$$

Households. Country  $i$  houses a population of identical households of mass  $s_i$ . Household preferences, like that of firms, are nested, with outer nest combining consumption bundles from three aggregate sectors, and inner nest combining bundles from subsectors of manufacturing. However, for the households, the outer nest is non-homothetic following Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021). In particular, household aggregate consumption  $C_i$  is an implicit function of consumption of sectoral bundles:

$$\sum_s \frac{1}{s} \frac{C_{is}}{C_i} = 1; \text{ where } s \in \{P; M; Sg\}; \quad (7)$$

and where manufacturing consumption  $C_{iM}$  satisfies

$$C_{iM} = \sum_m \frac{1}{m} C_{im}^{\frac{m-1}{m}}; \text{ where } m \in \{2; \dots; K\}; \quad (8)$$

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means that changes in each of these will induce larger shifts in trade. In this sense,  $\sigma_k$  operates like trade elasticity in this model.

4.  $\sigma_k$  stands for the gamma function. Absent normalization,  $\sigma_k$  appears in the price equations as a shifter common across economies. The simplification is thus without loss of generality. I assume that  $\sigma_k > 1$ . As long as this inequality is satisfied, the value of the parameter  $\sigma_k$  does not matter for the analysis and need not be estimated.

Lifetime utility of households is as follows:

$$U_i = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln C_{it}; \quad (9)$$

where  $\beta$  is the discount factor,  $\beta^t$  is the impatience shifter<sup>5</sup> and  $C_{it}$  is per-period household utility defined in equation (7).

Each household is endowed with one unit of labor which it supplies inelastically, such that labor income of each household is  $w_i$ . Households also receive a rebate  $T_{it}$ , to be defined shortly. There are no other sources of income, but households can engage in international borrowing and lending through Arrow-Debreu bonds, which cost  $\beta^t$ , and pay out a unit in the next period. Since all economies interact in one international market and there is no risk, everyone faces the same price of bonds. Finally, borrowing and lending incurs quadratic transaction costs, paid as a share of income, which is fully rebated to the household as  $\frac{b}{2} d_{it}^2$ . Thus, the period budget constraint of households is as follows:

$$E_{it} + \beta^{t+1} B_{it+1} + \frac{b}{2} d_{it}^2 w_i = w_i + B_{it} + T_{it}; \quad d_{it} = \frac{E_{it} - w_i}{w_i}; \quad (10)$$

where  $E_{it} = \sum_s P_{ist} C_{ist}$  is the total expenditure,  $B_{it}$  is this period's payment from bond holdings of the previous period, and  $\beta^{t+1} B_{it+1}$  is the sale of bonds which mature next period.

There are many impediments to international capital flows, such as risk of default or informational frictions. The convex adjustment costs capture, in reduced form, the idea that further deviation of expenditure from income  $d_{it}$ , becomes increasingly costly, while remaining highly tractable. Setting  $b = 0$  restores frictionless asset markets as in Eaton et al. (2016). The limit case of approaching infinity, instead, rules out international borrowing and produces a static environment as in Eaton and

5. The impatience shifters capture all the reasons that economies might want to lend or borrow aside from the consumption smoothing motive, such as the cross-country differences in demographics, risk-profiles, or development of the financial system that can give rise to international capital flows.



according to (5) and maximize profits (6); (iii) households maximize their utility (7) - (9) subject to per-period budget constraints (10); (iv) all markets clear: (11) - (14); and (v) normalization holds: (15).

Interpreting the decomposition. The accounting decomposition derived in Section 2 is a function of changes in trade shares, sectoral expenditure shares and aggregate trade deficits. All of these arise as equilibrium objects in the model. I discuss each in turn. As before, I suppress the input-output structure. See Appendix A.2 for the derivations, including the model with a fully flexible input-output structure.

First, trade shares respond to changes in costs of production vis-a-vis the competitors:

$$\tilde{\tau}_{jk} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{i \in I} \tilde{A}_{ik} \tau_{jk} w_i - \sum_{l \in I} \tau_{lk} \tilde{A}_{lk} w_l \quad !$$

Here,  $i$ 's trade share  $\tau_{ij}$  increases if  $i$ 's productivity increases, or if its export costs or input costs decrease by more than that of its trade-share weighted average competitor in  $j$ . The setup naturally gives rise to specialization subject to comparative advantage.

Second, national expenditure shares respond to preference shifters, as well as to changes in relative prices and aggregate consumption, which capture the operation of price- and income effects:

$$\tilde{\tau}_{in} = \begin{cases} \tilde{\tau}_{iP} + (1 - \eta_s) \frac{h}{P_i} \tilde{P}_{iP} - \tilde{P}_i + (P_i - C_i) \tilde{C}_i & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \tilde{\tau}_{in} + (1 - \eta_s) \frac{h}{P_{iM}} \tilde{P}_{iM} - \tilde{P}_i + (P_{iM} - C_i) \tilde{C}_i + (1 - \eta_m) \tilde{P}_{in} - \tilde{P}_{iM} & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ \tilde{\tau}_{iS} + (1 - \eta_s) \frac{h}{P_{iS}} \tilde{P}_{iS} - \tilde{P}_i + (P_{iS} - C_i) \tilde{C}_i & \text{if } n = K \end{cases}$$

Note that if  $\eta_s < 1$ , then price increase in  $i$  compared to other aggregate sectors leads to higher expenditure shares. Likewise, expenditure share of sector  $i$  increases if the aggregate consumption increases, and the expenditure elasticity of sector  $i$  is higher than the average expenditure elasticity  $\eta_i$ . In turn, allocation of spending within



the aggregate manufacturing responds to the relative prices across the subsectors of manufacturing. If  $\sigma_m < 1$ , households direct their expenditure towards the subsectors with rising relative prices.

Finally, households choose their aggregate trade deficits subject to their intertemporal optimization. If countries' net borrowing is small relative to their income, then

$$D_{it} = E_{it} w_{it} \left[ \frac{\tilde{\pi}_{it}}{1+b} + \frac{b w_{it}}{1+b} + \frac{\theta_t}{1+b} \right] w_{it}; \quad (16)$$

where  $\theta_t = \sum_i L_i E_i \theta_{it}$  and  $\tilde{\pi}_t = \sum_i L_i E_i \tilde{\pi}_{it}$ . Suppose international borrowing is prohibitively costly:  $b \rightarrow \infty$ . Then,  $E_{it} = w_{it}$ , agents spend exactly what they earn, and  $D_{it} = 0$ . If, instead, international borrowing is frictionless ( $b = 0$ ), then aggregate trade deficits respond to changes in incomes (the consumption smoothing motive, to impatience shifts, and to the shifts in the average expenditure elasticity). A higher average expenditure elasticity today increases contemporaneous returns to expenditure, and thus encourages borrowing.

Discussion: First, note that the terms of the accounting decomposition [1] summarize the effects of movements in trade shares, expenditure shares and aggregate trade deficits which are brought into motion by distinct mechanisms in the model. Thus, the three terms of the decomposition represent three different channels of structural change. Secondly, notice that the mapping between the shocks and mechanisms is many-to-many. Productivity, for example, affects each of trade specialization, sectoral expenditure shares, and borrowing terms. Thus, model simulations are insufficient to tell apart the mechanisms of structural change, but the accounting decomposition achieves the task. Conversely, individual mechanisms are brought into motion by multiple shocks. Thus, simulations are necessary to identify the exogenous drivers of structural change. In short, the two modes of analysis are complementary, and both are required to address the 'why' and 'how' of structural change.

## 4 Implementation

In this section, I discuss the calibration of the structural model and the implementation of the decomposition [1] in the data. I begin by describing the data.

### 4.1 Data Description

I use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) as a source of data on annual intermediate inputs use which varies by country and sector of both origin and destination,  $X_{jinkt}^{II}$ , and consumption series which vary by destination, sector and country of origin:  $X_{jikt}^{FC}$ .<sup>6</sup> I obtain the data on country-level population and sectoral price deflators from the WIOD Socio-Economic Accounts. In order to extend the sample length, I merge the Long Run (1965-2000) and 2013 Release (1995-2011) vintages of the dataset.

The dataset covers twenty five economies and an aggregate rest of the world region over years 1965 to 2011. I restrict my analysis to twenty economies, and group the remaining five together with the rest of the world. The sectoral coverage is at a two digit level and is subject to ISIC rev. 3.1 industrial classification. There are twenty three sectors in the data, thirteen of which are tradable: agriculture, mining, and eleven sectors that produce different manufacturing goods. I group agriculture and mining into one primary goods sector, and aggregate the ten services sectors into one. I keep manufacturing sectors disaggregated. The data description, cleaning and the construction of variables can be found in Appendix B.1

### 4.2 Implementing the Decomposition

To break down changes in sectoral shares into the operation of different channels, I first multiply both sides of the decomposition [1] by the beginning of the period value added shares to obtain changes measured in percentage points. Second, I use the observed annual changes in trade shares, expenditure shares and aggregate trade deficits

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6. See Woltjer, Gouma, and Timmer (2021) for the dataset construction.

in place of the infinitesimal changes. This gives rise to an empirical counterpart of the decomposition [1]:

$$\Delta a_{im} \approx \Delta a_{im}^{FO} = \Delta a_{im}(\cdot) + \Delta a_{im}(\cdot; \cdot) + \Delta a_{im}(\cdot, D): \quad [1]$$

Note that [1] holds exactly since the changes considered are infinitesimal and therefore the interaction terms are nil. In turn, annual changes are non-infinitesimal and therefore second- and higher-order terms may be non-zero. Hence, expression [1] represents a first-order approximation of changes in sectoral shares. In practice, annual changes are small enough to ensure an effectively exact fit between the left and right hand sides of expression [1], with correlation of 0.997. Thus, in what follows, I apply use the approximation terms  $\Delta a_{im}^{FO}$  in place of  $\Delta a_{im}$ . Finally, to economize on notation, in the rest of the paper I will be denoting  $\Delta a_{im}(\cdot; \cdot)$  as  $\Delta a_{im}^S$  for secular changes in sectoral demand,  $\Delta a_{im}(\cdot)$  as  $\Delta a_{im}^R$  for (Ricardian) specialization, and  $\Delta a_{im}(\cdot, D)$  as  $\Delta a_{im}^B$  for international borrowing.

### 4.3 Time-Invariant Parameter Values

There are seven time-invariant objects in the model  $\rho; \mu; \sigma; \sigma_s; \mu_m; \kappa; \tau$ .<sup>7</sup> I set the first four following Comin, Lashkari, and Mestieri (2021), who estimate a range of values for each. I pick  $\rho = 0.11$ ,  $\mu = 1$ ,  $\sigma = 1.21$  and  $\sigma_s = 0.5$  from the specification that features both developed and developing economies, as well as controls for trade. Under this parameterization, primary sector goods are necessity goods, services are luxury goods, and aggregate sectors are complements. Atalay (2017) estimates the elasticity of substitution across inputs from different industries using a wide range of specifications, identification strategies and samples, consistently finding estimates below one. I set  $\mu_m = 0.38$  following his estimate for WIOD sample. I set trade elasticities,  $\kappa$ , following Imbs and Mejean (2017).

7. While  $\rho$ ,  $\mu$ , and  $\tau$  feature in the model setup, they are not necessary for solving the model.

Parameter  $b$ , governing the cost of international borrowing, represents in reduced form a range of barriers to international capital flows, and as such, no direct counterpart is available. Instead, I use the Euler condition of the model to estimate  $b$  that minimizes the distance between the expenditure changes under no impatience shifters and that in the data. The procedure yields  $b = 7.5$  (see Appendix B.2 for details).

#### 4.4 Calibration of the Shocks Series

I solve the model in 'hat-algebra' form (see Online Appendix C.2). As a result, simulations use the changes of exogenous variables from level  $x_{t+1} = x_t$ , which I refer to as 'shocks'. The model retains the key property of Eaton and Kortum (2002): appropriately calibrated, it generates the paths of endogenous variables that exactly match those in the data. I discuss the calibration of each of the shock types in turns.

**Productivity and trade cost shocks.** The trade shares in the hat-algebra formulation of the model take the following form:

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k = \frac{\hat{c}_{ikt} \hat{a}_{jikt}}{\hat{A}_{ikt} \hat{P}_{jkt}^k} \quad (17)$$

To proceed, I make use of the multiplicative form of the structural gravity equations, which I estimate using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood method following Silva and Tenreyro (2006) (PPML from now onward). I assume that the bilateral trade cost changes can be represented as a product of the symmetric trade cost decline and an idiosyncratic term:  $\hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k = \hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k \hat{\mu}_{jikt}^k$ . Then, equation (17) can be rewritten as a product of exporter fixed effect  $e_{ikt} = (\hat{c}_{ikt} / \hat{A}_{ikt})^k$ , importer fixed effect  $m_{jkt} = \hat{P}_{jkt}^k$ , symmetric trade cost decline  $\hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k$  and an error term  $\hat{\mu}_{jikt}^k = \hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k$ , such that

$$\hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k = m_{jkt} e_{ikt} \hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k \hat{\mu}_{jikt}^k \quad (18)$$

Following Head and Ries (2001),  $\hat{\lambda}_{jikt}^k$  can be recovered from observed trade share

changes:

$$\hat{\Delta}_{jikt}^k = \frac{\hat{\Delta}_{jikt}^k - \hat{\Delta}_{ijkt}^k}{\hat{\Delta}_{iikt}^k - \hat{\Delta}_{jjkt}^k} \quad ! \quad 1=2$$

Together with destination and origin fixed effects by sector and year, these can be used to estimate the system. Note that this method amounts to requiring that asymmetric components of trade shocks have, on average, zero impact on trade shares.

Silva and Tenreyro (2006) advocate the use of equal weights on all observations, which improves the efficiency of the estimation under the assumption of conditional variance being proportional to conditional mean. However, in the context of 'hat-algebra' specification, this assumption may be violated when economies transition from near-zero to positive, albeit negligible, trade flows: observations with near-zero denominators result in trade share changes significantly larger than the rest. For example, my sample includes 513 observations with  $\hat{\Delta} > 10^3$  and 233 with  $\hat{\Delta} > 10^6$ . In contrast, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of trade share changes is 1.19. As the conditional variance of these observations is likely orders of magnitude higher than their conditional mean, unweighted PPML is likely to be extremely inefficient.<sup>9</sup> Since it is difficult to predict such transitions based on observables, I exclude observations with trade share changes above a certain threshold, effectively assigning them zero weight in the estimation. All other observations carry equal weight. In my baseline specification, I use the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of the dependent variable for a given sector and year as the cutoff. However, results remain virtually unchanged if 90<sup>th</sup> or 97.5<sup>th</sup> percentile cutoff are used instead.

Once the model is estimated, I use the importer fixed effect to back out model-consistent price deflators:  $P_{ikt}^k = m_{ikt}^{1-k}$ : Since fixed effects are identified up to a

8. Specifically, estimation procedure picks fixed effects such as to ensure that  $\sum_j P_j \hat{\Delta}_{jikt}^k = 0$ ; where  $\hat{\Delta}_{jikt}^k = m_{jkt} \epsilon_{ikt} \hat{\Delta}_{jikt}^k$  is the trade share change absent the asymmetric changes in trade costs.

9. Intuitively, in a sample where each country has twenty trading partners, there are twenty data points that identify country-sector level fixed effects. If one of the trade share changes is six orders of magnitude larger than others, this observation will dominate the estimation. Given the extreme nature of these outliers, it is unlikely that the estimate would converge even if all global economies were included in the sample.

sector-year multiplicative constant, I re-estimate all estimates so that the evolution of sectoral price deflators for the United States matches that from WIOD sectoral price index series. Finally, I combine the resultant price deflators with model-consistent changes in input costs  $\hat{c}_{ikt}$  to back out sectoral productivity and trade cost shocks:

$$\hat{A}_{ikt} = \frac{\hat{c}_{ikt} \hat{p}_{iikt}^{1-\alpha}}{\hat{p}_{ikt}}, \quad \hat{\tau}_{jikt} = \frac{\hat{c}_{ikt} \hat{p}_{jikt}^{1-\alpha}}{\hat{p}_{jikt}}.$$

I discuss the construction of input cost series in Appendix B.3.

**Preferences and production function shocks.** The model in changes links changes in endogenous variables to their levels in the beginning of the period and changes in exogenous shocks. These conditions can be inverted: plugging in the observed changes in endogenous variables returns the changes in exogenous shocks consistent with patterns observed in the data. Thus, I use the data on national expenditure shares, household expenditures, wages and intermediate expenditure shares to infer household sectoral expenditure shocks  $\hat{e}_{ikt}$ , impatience shocks  $\hat{\beta}$ , and intermediate input expenditure shocks  $\hat{m}_{ikt}$ . This completes the calibration of the model. I detail the calibration algorithm in Appendix B.3.

**Population.**  $\hat{L} = L_{t+1} = L_t$  can be obtained directly from the data.

## 4.5 Simulating the model

In the following section, I use model simulations to study the fundamental forces behind the process of structural change. I now briefly discuss the exercise. First, I simulate the model with one type of shocks active at a time. Adding up the results of such simulations gives rise to a decomposition of changes in sectoral shares into contributing shock series:

$$\Delta a_{ik} = \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{A}) + \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{\beta}) + \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{e}) + \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{m}) + \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{\tau}) + \Delta a_{ik}(\hat{L}); \quad [2]$$

where  $va_{ik}(\hat{A})$  denotes the changes in sectoral shares in a simulation with sectoral productivities calibrated following the baseline and all other shocks set to no change:  $\lambda = 1$ .<sup>10</sup> To study the channels of operation of individual shock types, I apply the decomposition [1] to the simulated series. For example, for the productivity shocks,

$$va_{ik}(\hat{A}) = va_{ik}^S(\hat{A}) + va_{ik}^R(\hat{A}) + va_{ik}^B(\hat{A}); \quad [19]$$

Finally, collecting the terms of decomposition [1] across simulations with one type of shocks active at a time sheds light on which shocks contribute to the operation of individual channels:

$$va_{ik}^X = va_{ik}^X(\hat{A}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\lambda}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\alpha}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\beta}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\gamma}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\delta}) + va_{ik}^X(\hat{\epsilon}); \quad [20]$$

where  $X \in \{S; R; B\}$ .

## 4.6 Aggregation

Much of the analysis that follows studies the evolution of aggregate manufacturing shares over the long run. Since results in [1] and [2] are at a sector-year level, to do this I aggregate these across the sub-sectors of manufacturing and across years:

$$\frac{2011}{1965} va_{im} = \sum_{t=1965}^{2011} X_{tM} va_{im};$$

and likewise for individual components in [1] and [2].

10. Note that summing up the results of these simulations gives rise to a first order approximation of the changes in sectoral shares in the data. The reason for this is that simulations with only a subset of shocks 'on' fail to account for interactions between shocks. Simulation with all shocks 'on' restores the exact  $t$ .

11. Note that since the second- and higher-order terms are close to zero at a yearly level, adding up the results of the left hand side of the decompositions [1] and [2] across years likewise results in an effectively exact fit to the long-run changes in the data (with correlations of 1 and 0.99 respectively). This exercise is distinct from using long-run changes in decompositions [1] and [2]. While the former tracks the marginal contribution of individual channels as economies evolve, the latter considers a one-off change from sectoral shares as observed in 1965. Nonetheless, the correlation between the

## 4.7 Model Fit

While the model can be inverted to obtain a set of restrictions on exogenous shocks that ensure exact fit between the model and the data, these restrictions are insufficient to identify the shock series uniquely. In turn, different additional identifying assumptions give rise to different shock series estimates. For example, instead of using the PPML procedure, it is common to identify trade cost and productivity series by requiring that the model-generated sectoral price deflators equal those in the data. Likewise, calibration of the model with perfect capital mobility,  $b = 0$ , yields impatience shocks that differ from the ones calibrated with  $b > 0$ . Which ones should be used? In this subsection, I use the fit between the partial specification of the model and the data to select between different shock series estimates. Specifically, I simulate the model with one type of shocks active at a time and compare it with the moments in the data. The moments I use are the changes in sectoral value added shares and their breakdown subject to decomposition [1]. Results can be seen in Table 1.

The first six columns record the correlation between the data and the simulations subject to my baseline calibration. Each shock series produces a correlation of between 0.24 and 0.55 with the changes in sectoral shares in the data<sup>12</sup>. Furthermore, individual shock series show a better fit with the components of decomposition they affect directly. As such, the correlations between the trade specialization term in the data and that in the 'only productivity' and 'only trade costs' simulations are 0.44 and 0.56. The borrowing terms in the 'only impatience' counterfactual yield a correlation of 0.69, whereas the secular terms in the preference and production shifters specifications show correlations of 0.24 and 0.55 with that in the data.

In columns (7) and (8) I present the results for trade cost- and sectoral productivity shocks identified using sectoral price deflators from the data. The deterioration

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approximate changes in sectoral shares in [1] and [2] obtained by aggregating across the years and by using long-run differences is 0.89 and 0.86 respectively. Thus, for most economies, the interactions across the channels and shocks are second-order.

12. The exception is population shocks, which have no predictive power.



of the  $t$ , compared to my baseline calibration, is practically uniform. Crucially, the correlation of the 'productivities only' specification with the trade specialization term decreases to mere 0.08: productivities estimated using price deflators have essentially no bearing on the specialization patterns observed in the data. One reason for this poor performance is the quality of the data: sectoral deflators at the two-digit level of disaggregation for a large sample of economies going back to 1965 are often not available. In these cases, missing price deflators in WIOD are obtained using extrapolation of available price series<sup>13</sup>. Secondly, price indices in the data reflect both differences in costs as well as differences in quality. In the world where quality differences across economies are important, price series need to be adjusted for quality before being used for estimation. Results in columns (7) and (8) suggest that the measurement error associated with extrapolation and unaccounted quality differences is considerable.

Finally, column (9) reports the  $t$  of the impatience shocks series estimated under perfect capital mobility. Note that the correlation between the borrowing terms in the data and the simulation that uses these shocks is 0.14. Thus, despite having a direct effect on borrowing, used alone, impatience shocks estimated this way do poorly in predicting the effects of borrowing. The deterioration of the  $t$  is not coincidental: free capital flows specification predicts that the fast-growing economies should be borrowing aggressively. In the data, they rarely do. In order to reconcile the model and the data, this specification fits fast-growing economies with extreme patience, which, when modelled alone, results in large counterfactual surpluses. In comparison, the model with non-zero financial frictions rationalizes the lack of borrowing through high cost of engaging in international finance. As a result, recovered impatience series give rise to counterfactual simulations that show a better fit to the data.

I now briefly discuss the fit between my baseline specification and the data. First, the correlation between the price series in the data and price series recovered using

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13. If industry-level value added deflators are available, these are used in place of industry-level deflators. If these are unavailable, aggregate value added deflator is used as a proxy. For RoW, US deflators are used.

	A		L		!		P	A <sup>P</sup>	f <sup>c</sup>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
va	0.28	0.29	0.27	-0.02	0.24	0.55	0.21	0.20	0.26
va <sup>S</sup>	0.32	0.35	0.03	-0.07	0.28	0.62	0.25	0.32	0.20
va <sup>R</sup>	0.59	0.44	0.20	0.15	0.21	0.02	0.40	0.08	0.05
va <sup>B</sup>	0.30	0.04	0.69	0.00	0.11	-0.16	0.18	0.01	0.14

Table 1: Fit of the Shock Series

Note: The table presents correlations between the objects in the data (rows), and the corresponding moments in a simulation with one set of shocks active at a time (columns). The correlations are computed over all countries, sectors and years (N = 12558). The first six columns use the shock series from the baseline calibration. The next two columns use shock series estimated using price deflators from the data. The last column, in turn, uses impatience shocks estimated in a specification with free capital flows ( $b = 0$ ).

the PPML procedure is 0.94. Note that this is in no contradiction to the differences in the model fit presented in Table 1: specialization is, period by period, determined by the differences in the relative productivities across each economy's subsectors, compared to that of the competitors. Thus, small differences in sectoral productivities within a country and period can lead to sizeable differences in countries' patterns of specialization. In turn, the time trend of price deflators in my calibration is pinned down by the normalization to the US price deflator series from WIOD and thus aligns well with that in the data, while the cross-country heterogeneity in sectoral productivities is mainly determined by the observed changes in output per worker. As a result, despite small differences in estimated deflators, my baseline specification replicates the long-run changes in real consumption in the data exactly.

The summary statistics of trade cost and productivity shocks can be seen in Online Appendix C.3. I find that trade costs have declined over the period, by 28% on average. However, trade costs for China, Taiwan, South Korea, Brazil and India have declined more rapidly, almost halving over the period. South Korea saw the most rapid productivity growth over the period, triple that of the United States; Taiwan and Brazil saw the second and third biggest increases.

## 5 Results

In this section, I apply the results from Sections 2, 3 and 4 to study the dynamics of structural transformation. In Section 5.1 I discuss the relative importance of mechanisms and structural shocks in driving manufacturing shares in my sample. In Section 5.2, I focus on the origins of cross-country heterogeneity in patterns of industrialization. Finally, in Section 5.3 I discuss the heterogeneous patterns across the subsectors of manufacturing.

### 5.1 Drivers of Manufacturing Shares

Figure 1 below presents the decomposition [1], applied to the aggregate manufacturing shares between years 1965 and 2011.

Figure 1: Mechanisms of Changes in Manufacturing Value Added Shares

Note: The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 1965 and 2011. The bars correspond to the components of decomposition [1].

First, note that the secular component, capturing changes in final and intermediate expenditure shares, is the key driver behind the changes in aggregate manufacturing shares in this period. To quantify this statement, I compute the relative contribution

of the components of decomposition [1] to the observed change in manufacturing shares as follows:

$$RC^X = \frac{P}{x} \frac{P_j va_{imj}^X}{P_j va_{imj}^X}; \quad \text{where } X = f R; S; Bg:$$

I find that the secular component accounts for 60% of the observed change in aggregate manufacturing shares. In turn, trade specialization and borrowing terms contribute 23% and 17%, respectively. In other words, not only does openness matter, but, on top of that, trade in goods and trade in assets play distinct and quantitatively important roles.

Next, I turn to exogenous drivers of structural change in my model. To do so, I conduct decomposition [2] described in Section 4. I plot the results in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Structural Drivers of Manufacturing Value Added Shares

Note: The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 1965 and 2011. The bars correspond to the components of decomposition [2].

Computing the relative contribution as before, I find that the most important exogenous driver are productivity shocks, accounting for 33% of the changes in aggregate manufacturing shares. Production and preference shifters are the second and third in

importance, explaining 27% and 14% of the change respectively. Impatience and trade cost shocks account for the remaining 12% and 11%. The contribution of changes in population is negligible.

Finally, I apply the decomposition [20] to see which structural shocks are responsible for the operation of each of the channels. The results can be seen in Table 2 (also see Figure C.1 in Online Appendix C.4). In line with the analysis in Section 3, I find that trade specialization is primarily driven by changes in sectoral productivities and trade costs. Changes in these series affect the relative costs of sourcing from different destinations, and, therefore, patterns of specialization. Note, additionally, that impatience shocks, too, matter for specialization. Their role is mediated via the changes in cost of labour: an economy that borrows experiences a temporary boom which raises its wages, and, through them, the price of its exports. As a result, some of its customers switch towards alternative suppliers. The secular channel, in turn, is driven primarily by changes in sectoral productivities: these affect both the relative prices of sectoral goods and incomes, thus bringing both price- and income effects into play. Meanwhile, preference and production function shifters drive changes in sectoral expenditure shares over and above those that can be explained through changing prices and incomes. Finally, the borrowing term is due to two factors: changing productivities and impatience shocks. The former render economies richer, which affects the saving behavior, whereas the latter capture changing motives for saving that go beyond the consumption smoothing.

	A		!		L	
va	33	11	12	14	27	2
va <sup>S</sup>	43	6	1	16	33	1
va <sup>R</sup>	24	47	9	5	8	7
va <sup>B</sup>	38	6	45	3	5	3

Table 2: Contribution of Shock Series

Note: The table presents the relative contribution of shock series (columns) to objects in the data (rows). To measure relative contribution of shock series  $X$ , I simulate a model where only shocks  $X$  follow the baseline, and all other shocks are set to 1. The values are in percentage points.

## 5.2 Cross-Country Heterogeneity

It is clear from Figure 1 that both trade specialization and international borrowing are important for explaining the cross-country heterogeneity in patterns of industrialization. To make this statement concrete, notice first that one would expect similar compositional dynamics in economies at similar levels of development: their income levels should imply similar composition of consumption baskets, their comparative advantage is likely to be centered on similar sectors, and, they should find themselves at the same end of global capital flows. Thus, to study cross-country heterogeneity in patterns of structural change, I split my sample into two equally sized groups on the basis of their GDP per capita in 1965. For each of the groups, I break down the the change in the aggregate manufacturing share compared to the group average into a sum of de-meanded components of decomposition [1]:

$$va_{im} - \overline{va_m} = va_{im}^R - \overline{va_m^R} + va_{im}^S - \overline{va_m^S} + va_{im}^B - \overline{va_m^B};$$

and compute the relative contributions of each term. Results can be seen in Table 3.

	Lower Income	Higher Income
Secular	56	46
Specialization	26	27
Borrowing	18	27

Table 3: Relative Contributions to De-meanded Changes in Manufacturing Shares

Note: Lower income group: China, India, South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan, Portugal, Mexico, Japan, Greece and Spain. Higher income group: Italy, Finland, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Australia, France, Canada, Sweden and United States. Values in percentage points.

Observe that secular changes in sectoral demand, although still the primary contributor, matter less for heterogeneity than for overall changes in manufacturing shares. Instead, around a quarter of the dynamics is now due to trade specialization and international borrowing.

A related point is made in Sposi, Yi, and Zhang (2021), who document the increase in variance of the logarithm of manufacturing shares over time and argue that this is an open economy phenomenon: the authors calibrate a multi-country, open economy model of structural change, and show that a counterfactual simulation with countries in autarky shows no such increase. To shed light on the open economy drivers of this pattern, I use the decomposition [1] to break down the evolution of manufacturing shares into contributions of the secular, specialization, and borrowing terms, and then plot the variance of the logarithm of the resultant series. Results can be seen in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Industry Polarization by Mechanism

Note: Red dashed line in all panels represents the unconditional variance of the logarithm of manufacturing value added shares in my sample in a given year. The blue lines represent, respectively, the variance of the logarithm of manufacturing shares computed as  $va_{im,t}^X = va_{im,t} + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} va_{im,t+s}^X$  for  $X \in \{S, R, B\}$ . When all three components are added jointly (Panel (a)), the series tracks the data by construction.

I find that most of the industry polarization is due to the operation of the borrowing channel. In turn, trade specialization played no role, and secular forces pushed

against polarization. Note that this is in no contradiction to the results earlier in this section: both secular forces and trade specialization matter for heterogeneity, but not more so today than previously. However, international borrowing did increase over time, giving rise to industry polarization.

Finally, Figure 1 sheds light on the industrialization experiences of individual economies. For example, most of the change in manufacturing shares in Taiwan and South Korea, two economies with the highest industrialization rates between 1965 and 2011, can be attributed to trade specialization. This occurred during a time of deindustrialization for most economies, highlighting the transformative force of export-led industrialization. Likewise, losses in comparative advantage contributed to two of the most rapid deindustrialization experiences in my sample { those of the United Kingdom and Australia. In turn, international borrowing channel is the sole reason high-income, surplus economies like Sweden and Finland experienced an increase in manufacturing shares during this period. Similarly, Germany's ability to maintain a relatively high manufacturing share despite its high income can be credited to its status as a lender. Contrast this with the United States and the United Kingdom, where aggregate trade deficits have acted to speed up the process of deindustrialization.

### 5.3 Cross-Sector Heterogeneity

It is common to treat manufacturing as homogeneous. However, manufacturing contains subsectors as distinct as textiles, electrical equipment, food production and metals. In this subsection, I investigate the sectoral dynamics within manufacturing.

Following Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), I first find the best quadratic fit between the countries' manufacturing shares and log-GDP per capita. However, instead of focusing on the aggregate manufacturing, I break it up into low-technology and high-technology subsectors. Results can be seen in Figure 4.

First, note that both the aggregate and the low-technology manufacturing shares



#### Figure 4: Structural Change within Manufacturing

Note: Panels present the quadratic relationship between log-GDP per capita and sectoral shares.

exhibit the so-called 'hump-shaped' pattern. Economies initially industrialize, and then undergo deindustrialization, as they develop. At the same time, however, the share of high-technology subsectors essentially attens out as incomes grow. Moreover, income is only a weak predictor of high-technology manufacturing shares, with the  $R^2$  of the quadratic relationship of 0.06. On the other hand, nal expenditure shares on both low- and high-technology manufacturing exhibit a 'hump'. Thus, while households eventually switch out of high-technology manufacturing expenditure, this does not feed through into the production structure of the economies. What, then, determines the relative size of the high-technology subsectors?

To address this question, I apply the decomposition [1] to the two subsectors. Results can be seen in Figure 5 (see Figure C.2 in Online Appendix C.4 for industry-level results). The gure reveals stark heterogeneity in the patterns of industrialization between the two. For low-technology manufacturing, secular forces are the predominant force { explaining 68% of the observed change and, in virtually all cases, causing deindustrialization. For high-technology manufacturing, on the other hand, the contribution of secular forces is comparable to that of specialization (explaining 42%

and 41% respectively). Furthermore, whereas low-technology manufacturing shares displayed a global trend, high-technology manufacturing shares, instead, diverged. As such, a small subset of economies { South Korea, Taiwan, Finland, China, Mexico, Japan and Germany } increasingly specialized in production of high-technology manufacturing. Other economies either de-specialized, or saw little change.

Figure 5: Mechanisms of Structural Change across Sectors

Note: The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 1965 and 2011. The bars correspond to the components of decomposition [1].

Finally, note that some economies specialized in low-technology subsectors at the expense of high-technology subsectors and vice versa, thus specializing in manufacturing. To quantify the importance of this process, I recompute the relative contribution of the channels, this time taking the composition of manufacturing into account. Specifically, I compute

$$RC^X = \frac{P}{X} \frac{\sum_j p_{i,m}^j va_{i,m}^X}{\sum_j p_{i,m}^j va_{i,m}^X}; \quad \text{where } X = \{R; S; Bg\}$$

I find that the secular forces are responsible for 57%, specialization for 31%, and international borrowing for 12% of the observed dynamics in the composition of aggregate manufacturing. To sum up, specialization played a more important role within man-

ufacturing than it did for the aggregate.

## 6 Case Studies

In the previous section I have argued that intra-industry specialization and international borrowing are critical for understanding structural change in an open economy. In this section, I use this insight to revisit two long-standing questions linking trade and structural change { the impact of China on the manufacturing sectors around the world, and the role of trade in the `miracle' industrialization of South Korea.

### 6.1 The rise of China

Between 2000 and 2011, China's economy tripled in size, jumping the ranks from seventh to second largest economy in the world. Following its accession to the WTO in 2001, China gained access to new markets, cementing its position as a key player in international trade. What would have happened had the productivity growth in China stalled or if the trade liberalization with China did not occur? What would the global manufacturing look like had China not ran up its current account surpluses? In short, what was the effect of China?

To answer these questions, I run a series of counterfactuals, beginning with a specification which I refer to as `China off'. In this counterfactual, all exogenous shock series for economies other than China evolve as in the baseline. All shocks relating to China, in turn, are calibrated so that China remains `frozen' in terms of both its exogenous processes and its endogenous outcomes { sectoral value added shares, sectoral expenditure shares, GDP, expenditures and aggregate trade deficit { at the level observed in 2000. This entails setting all China-related shocks to 1, and re-calibrating sectoral productivities and impatience shocks in China to ensure no changes in specialization or borrowing in the consecutive years<sup>14</sup>. The difference

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14. Note that setting changes in sectoral productivities to one in China does not preclude spe-

between this specification and the data, which I refer to as 'China effect', isolates the total effect of China on the manufacturing shares around the world. In turn, taking the difference between a variation of the 'China only' simulation but now with a given exogenous series for China following the baseline and the 'China only' counterfactual identifies the contribution of a given exogenous shock series in China to the total 'China effect'. See Appendix B.4 for details.

### Figure 6: China-driven De-industrialization

Note: The crosses mark the changes in aggregate manufacturing shares in the the data between 2000 and 2011. The yellow bars correspond to the change in manufacturing shares in the 'China only' counterfactual. The red bars are the complement of the yellow bars, and capture the 'China effect'.

Figure 6 shows that between 2000 and 2011, China did, in fact, drive a decline in manufacturing shares around the world, causing the manufacturing share in an average economy to contract by 0.38 percentage points, contributing 21% of the change in manufacturing shares { a disproportionate effect given China's share of the global GDP of 3.5% in 2000.

Next, I apply the decompositions [1] and [2] to dissect the aggregate 'China effect' cialization as it is the relative changes in sectoral productivities that matter in (17). Likewise for borrowing, where the relative realizations of impatience shocks determine which economies borrow.

into the operation of different channels and exogenous shock series in China. Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows that trade specialization was the key channel for China-driven deindustrialization. However, much of this effect was concentrated in a handful of economies { Australia, Brazil, Canada, and India { important producers of agriculture and mining, with changes in productivities and trade liberalization playing a roughly equal role (see Panel (c)). Nonetheless, for the majority of economies { including the United States { the main channel at play was, instead, borrowing. China ran large current account surpluses over the 2000-2011 period, which pushed the rest of the world towards borrowing. Lower aggregate trade balances meant that economies were spending more on domestic non-tradables, and made up for increases in demand for tradables by imports. Finally, Panel (d) shows that much of the surpluses in China can be attributed to the rapid productivity growth in China during this period.

Figure 8 reveals that, while China had put a squeeze on both low-technology and high-technology subsectors of manufacturing, it played a relatively more important role for the latter { explaining 38% of the observed change, with much of the impact occurring in a single subsector { electrical equipment (see Online Appendix C.4). Moreover, at this more granular level, most of the effect was due to specialization (at 50% and 71% respectively). Thus, in addition to causing a decline in the aggregate manufacturing shares, China had driven reallocation of production within manufacturing, away from the high-technology subsectors, with the main competitors { United States, Germany, Finland, Denmark and Sweden { affected the most.

I now briefly discuss how these results compare with earlier studies. Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (2019) construct a quantitative model of trade and use simulations to obtain general equilibrium effects of the China shock, focusing on the experience of the United States. Authors find that between 2000 and 2007, China has caused the US manufacturing employment share to decline by 0.38 p.p. (the corresponding number in my analysis is 0.34 p.p.). Additionally, both studies find that most of the effect was concentrated in the electrical equipment subsector.

### Figure 7: China-driven De-industrialization by Shock

Panel (a): The crosses mark the changes in manufacturing shares driven by China between 2000 and 2011. The colored bars correspond to the components of decomposition [1] applied to the 'China effect' series. Panels (b)-(d): Coloured bars correspond to contribution of individual shock series in China, computed using decomposition [2], to the operation of individual channels in Panel (a).

In this paper, I show that the experience of the United States is representative, with all economies in my sample experiencing China-induced deindustrialization. However, the key further insight from the present analysis is that for most economies, much of this effect is attributable to the aggregate trade surpluses in China, rather than to the competitive pressures it imposed. The intuition is that for most economies, aggregate manufacturing makes up the vast majority of their exports. Thus, with the exception of producers of mining and agricultural goods,

### Figure 8: China-driven De-industrialization within Manufacturing

Note: The crosses mark the changes in sub-sectoral shares in the the data between 2000 and 2011. The yellow bars correspond to the change in sub-sectoral shares in the 'China o' counterfactual. The red bars are the complement of the yellow bars, and capture the 'China e ect'.

most economies respond to the rise of China by specializing within manufacturing. Conversely, the e ect of China-induced declines in aggregate trade balances applies to all tradable sectors, thus putting a squeeze on the aggregate manufacturing.<sup>15</sup>

## 6.2 Industrialization in South Korea

Starting in 1960s, South Korea underwent one of the most rapid and successful episodes of industrialization in history, evolving from an agrarian economy into a leading global manufacturer. In this segment I ask: what was the contribution of openness to this dramatic transformation?

Between 1965 and 2011, South Korea saw its manufacturing share double, from 17 to 33 percentage points. Figure 9 plots the evolution of the primary and manufacturing shares over time, alongside the split by low- and high-technology subsectors

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<sup>15</sup> This argument has a parallel in Kehoe, Ruhl, and Steinberg (2018), who construct a two-economy, two-sector dynamic model of structural change and argue that aggregate trade deficits have played a secondary role in deindustrialization in the US. As authors only allow for one tradable sector, there is no specialization in their model. Likewise, since for many economies aggregate manufacturing is effectively the sole tradable sector, here I argue that the role of competition in China-induced decline in the aggregate manufacturing share is, necessarily, limited.

of manufacturing. The figure makes clear that structural transformation in South Korea featured a dramatic contraction in the primary share of the economy. Moreover, the patterns of industrialization within manufacturing were distinct, with the low-technology manufacturing share peaking in the mid-1980s, and that of the high-technology manufacturing rising throughout the period.

Figure 9: Industrialization in South Korea

Note: Green line plots the value added share of the respective sector against time. Dashed lines correspond to the the cumulated contribution of the components of decomposition [1] applied to changes in sectoral shares in the data, computed as  $\Delta a_{im;T}^X = \Delta a_{im;t} + \sum_{s=1}^{T-t} \Delta a_{im;t+s}^X$  for  $X \in \{S; R; B\}$ .

Decomposition [1] lends further insights into this dynamics by decomposing the total change in each of the panels into the cumulative contributions of specialization, secular, and borrowing terms respectively. The figure makes clear that, while all three forces have contributed to the industrialization in South Korea, trade specialization was the primary driver, responsible for over a half of the observed dynamics.



To shed light on this process, I repeat the exercise in the previous section, this time 'freezing' and, shock by shock, 'unfreezing' South Korea, while letting the rest of the world evolve following the baseline calibration. The difference between the specification with South Korean productivities following the baseline and 'South Korea only' captures the counterfactual evolution of sectoral shares in South Korea had only productivities evolved between 1965 and 2011, and likewise for other exogenous series. Finally, to study the drivers behind South Korean specialization, I decompose these counterfactual series using expression [1]. Results can be seen in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Industrialization in South Korea, by Shock Series

Note: Green lines plot the value added share of the respective sector against time. Red lines correspond to the the cumulated contribution of the specialization components of decomposition [1] applied to the sectoral shares in 'only sectoral productivities' and 'only trade liberalization' in South Korea counterfactual series.

First, I find that the main force that pushed South Korea to move resources out of the primary sector and into manufacturing was trade liberalization. Note that this

process reflected the initial patterns of comparative advantage, South Korea being a net importer of agricultural goods already in 1965<sup>16</sup>. However, this aggregate picture conceals two distinct trends. Turning to the dynamics within manufacturing, first note that trade liberalization has been pushing resources into the low-technology subsectors of manufacturing specifically, mainly into textiles (see Figure C.4 in Online Appendix C.4). However, at the same time, the evolution of sectoral productivities in South Korea has been favouring high-technology subsectors of manufacturing. Thus, just as resources were entering low-technology subsectors thanks to trade liberalization, there were concurrent outflows towards the high-technology subsectors, mainly electrical equipment, due to the shift in South Korea's relative productivities. In short, 'miracle' industrialization in South Korea would not have been possible without both.

## 7 Conclusion

That openness is somehow the reason for many economies' rapid deindustrialization, sometimes enables episodes of 'miracle' industrialization, and at other times prevents the more traditional staging of structural change resulting in 'premature deindustrialization' is a widely held view. Yet, due to the tendency of economies to undergo structural change for secular reasons even in autarky, the contribution of openness has been challenging to quantify. Another difficulty concerns the disentangling of the mechanisms of structural change, as agents often respond to same set of shocks by adjusting along multiple margins. If, e.g., China becomes more productive, is the resultant world-wide deindustrialization due to declining price of imports? Rising incomes due to gains from trade? Loss of comparative advantage and despecialization? Aggregate deficits that develop in response to surpluses in China?

In this paper I develop a methodology to study structural change in an open

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16. A similar point is made in Uy, Yi, and Zhang (2013), who construct a two-country, three-sector model to study industrialization in South Korea. Authors show that compared to autarky, open economy setup generates faster industrialization, which is in part driven by trade cost declines and in part by the evolution of sectoral productivities in South Korea.

economy that enables me to address this type of questions by breaking down changes in sectoral shares as observed in the data into the contribution of different mechanisms and exogenous drivers. The key methodological innovations in my analysis are (i) the accounting decomposition developed in Section 2, (ii) the introduction of frictions in international financial markets that give rise to plausible aggregate trade imbalances dynamics developed in Section 3, and (iii) the identification of sectoral productivities in datasets with no reliable sectoral de ator series developed in Section 4. In turn, this enables me to go further than previous studies in identifying the relative importance of different mechanisms of structural change, carefully considering trade in assets as well as trade in goods, and going beyond the aggregate manufacturing. As a result, in this paper I show, for the first time, that trade specialization and international borrowing are two quantitatively important yet distinct mechanisms of structural change, that much of the structural change in open economies happens within manufacturing, and that paying attention to these dynamics can yield novel insights into the long-standing questions at the intersection of trade and structural change.

More broadly, this paper makes a methodological contribution. In it, I have shown how to interpret changing patterns of global production through the lens of a calibrated general equilibrium model with realistic dynamics of aggregate trade imbalances. The setup enables granular understanding of effects of fundamental shocks and the mechanisms of their operation, with the link between the two modes of analysis spelled out explicitly and grounded in theory. The mapping between the decompositions and objects in the data, in turn, makes quantification exercises transparent and easy to interpret. The model is easy to calibrate for any number of countries and at an arbitrary level of disaggregation, whereas its modular nature makes it possible to introduce further frictions to address a wider range of questions. As twenty first century marks a backlash against globalization and a renewed interest in industrial policy, the present paper offers a framework to think through the potential effects of such policies in a quantitatively rigorous manner.

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# A Mathematical Appendix

## A.1 Derivation of Decomposition 1

Consider the market clearing condition,

$$Y_{ik} = \sum_j s_{jik} D_j Y_j + \sum_n s_{jnk} Y_{jn} ;$$

where  $D_i = E_i = w_i = d_i + 1$  is the aggregate demand and  $Y_j = \sum_n s_{jnl} Y_{jn} = \sum_n V_{jn}$  is the country's GDP. Let  $V_{ik}$  be value added in country  $i$ 's sector  $k$ . This expression can be rewritten in matrix form:

$$Y = ADV + BY ;$$

where  $A$  is a block matrix of dimensions  $(IK) \times (IK)$ , with blocks in position  $(i, j)$  represented by a diagonal matrix of sectoral trade shares  $s_{jik}$ , matrices  $D$  and  $A$  are diagonal matrices with aggregate demands and national expenditure shares  $d_i$  and  $s_{ik}$  in positions  $(i-1)K + k$ ,  $B$  is a block diagonal matrix of  $K$  by  $K$  matrices of one, and  $B$  is a block diagonal matrix of countries' intermediate input expenditure share matrices.  $Y$  and  $V$  are vectors of sectoral sales and value added, respectively, stacked by country.

Collecting the sales on the left hand side and multiplying by a diagonal matrix of sectoral labor shares  $S_j$ , obtain a vector of sectoral value added in levels:

$$V = B_1 L A D V = V ;$$

where  $L = (I - B)^{-1}$  is the Leontief inverse. This system has infinitely many solutions. Normalize the value added of the last country and sector  $V_{iK} = 1$ . Let  $\mathbf{1}_{iK}$  stand for the first  $(IK - 1)$  rows and columns of matrix  $A$  and  $\mathbf{1}$  for the first

$IK - 1$  elements of the last column of matrix  $V$ . The normalized system is then:

$$V_{IK-1} = \tilde{V}_{IK-1} V_{IK-1} + \tilde{V}_{IK-1} V_{IK-1} ; \quad V_{IK-1} = (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1} V_{IK-1} :$$

Totally differentiating  $V_{IK-1}$  with respect to elements in  $B_1, B$  and  $A$ , and  $D$ , yields

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}^R &= B_1 L \tilde{A} D + B_1 L \tilde{B} L A D ; \\ \tilde{V}^S &= \tilde{B}_1 B_1 L A D + B_1 L \tilde{B} L A D + B_1 L \tilde{A} A D ; \\ \tilde{V}^B &= B_1 L A \tilde{D} D ; \end{aligned}$$

where  $\tilde{\cdot}$  stands for element-wise multiplication and matrices with tilde collect infinitesimal changes from level. Let  $\tilde{X}_{IK-1}$  stand for the first  $IK - 1$  rows and columns of matrix  $X$  and  $\tilde{X}$  for the first  $IK - 1$  elements of the last column of matrix  $X$ .

Let  $\oslash$  denote element-wise division. Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^R &= (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^R (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} + (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^R V_{IK-1} ; \\ \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^S &= (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^S (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} + (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^S V_{IK-1} ; \\ \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^B &= (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^B (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} + (I - \tilde{V}_{IK-1})^{-1} \tilde{V}_{IK-1}^B V_{IK-1} \end{aligned}$$

collect deviations from level in sectoral value added as a function of deviations from level in trade shares, final and intermediate expenditure shares, and aggregate trade deficits respectively. The change in sectoral value added shares can be computed as follows:

$$va_{ik}^X = v_{ik}^X \sum_n^X va_{in} v_{in}^X \quad \text{for } X \in \{R, S, B\}$$

No input-output version is as above, but with  $B_1 = L = I$ , where  $I$  is an identity matrix.

## A.2 Linking Endogenous Variables and Exogenous Shocks

Trade shares and prices. First, apply total differentiation to trade shares:

$$d_{jik} = \frac{w_i}{A_{ik} P_{jk}} \left( \frac{dw_i}{w_i} + \frac{d_{jik}}{d_{jik}} \frac{dA_{ik}}{A_{ik}} + \frac{dP_{jk}}{P_{jk}} \right) \quad \tilde{d}_{jik} = \frac{dw_i}{w_i} + \frac{d_{jik}}{d_{jik}} \frac{dA_{ik}}{A_{ik}} + \frac{dP_{jk}}{P_{jk}} :$$

Applying total differentiation to the price index yields

$$dP_{ik} = \frac{w_l}{A_{lk}} \left( \frac{dw_l}{w_l} + \frac{d_{ilk}}{d_{ilk}} \frac{dA_{lk}}{A_{lk}} \right) \quad P_{ik} = \frac{dw_l}{w_l} + \frac{d_{ilk}}{d_{ilk}} \frac{dA_{lk}}{A_{lk}} :$$

Expenditure shares. Applying total differentiation to expenditure shares yields

$$d_{in} = \frac{d_{iP}}{P_{iP}} + (1 - s) \frac{dP_{iP}}{P_{iP}} \frac{dE_i}{E_i} + \frac{dC_i}{C_i} P \quad ; \quad \text{if } n = 1$$

$$d_{in} = \frac{d_{iM}}{P_{iM}} + (1 - s) \frac{dP_{iM}}{P_{iM}} \frac{dE_i}{E_i} + \frac{dC_i}{C_i} M \quad +$$

$$\frac{d_{in}}{P_{in}} + (1 - s) \frac{dP_{in}}{P_{in}} \frac{dP_{iM}}{P_{iM}} \quad ; \quad \text{if } 1 < n < K$$

$$\frac{d_{iS}}{P_{iS}} + (1 - s) \frac{dP_{iS}}{P_{iS}} \frac{dE_i}{E_i} + \frac{dC_i}{C_i} S \quad ; \quad \text{if } n = K;$$

Totally differentiating the per-period utility as a function of expenditure and prices

$$\frac{d_{is}}{P_{is}} + (1 - s) \frac{dP_{is}}{P_{is}} - (1 - s) \frac{dE_i}{E_i} + (1 - s) \frac{dC_i}{C_i} = 0:$$

Expenditure weights are invariant to uniform scaling, in terms of the resulting observables. Thus, I pick the scaling such that  $\frac{d_{is}}{P_{is}} = 0$  and  $\frac{d_{im}}{P_{im}} = 0$ .



Plugging into the expenditure share changes and rewriting in tilde notation yields:

$$\tilde{\pi}_i^n = \begin{cases} \tilde{\pi}_{iP} + (1 - s) \frac{h}{P_i} \tilde{P}_{iP} + (P_i - 1) C_i & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \tilde{\pi}_{iM} + (1 - s) \frac{h}{P_i} \tilde{P}_{iM} + (P_i - 1) C_i + \tilde{\pi}_{in} + (1 - m) \frac{h}{P_i} \tilde{P}_{in} - \tilde{\pi}_{iM} & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ \tilde{\pi}_{iS} + (1 - s) \frac{h}{P_i} \tilde{P}_{iS} + (P_i - 1) C_i & \text{if } n = K \end{cases}$$

where  $\tilde{P}_i = \frac{P_i}{P_{is}}$ ,  $\tilde{P}_{iM} = \frac{P_i}{P_{im}}$ , and  $C_i = \frac{E_i}{P_i} \frac{P_{is}}{P_{is}}$ .

Expenditure. Finally, totally differentiating the Euler equation,

$$\frac{d \tilde{\pi}_i^n}{\tilde{\pi}_i^n} = \frac{d \tilde{\pi}_i^n}{\tilde{\pi}_i^n} + \frac{b d \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} + \frac{d E_{it}}{E_{it}} + \frac{d \tilde{\pi}_i^n}{\tilde{\pi}_i^n} \quad ! \quad E_{it} = \tilde{\pi}_i^n \tilde{\tau}_t \frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} \tilde{\tau}_t;$$

where  $\tilde{d}_t = \frac{E_{it} (E_{it} w_{it})}{w_{it} d_{it}}$ : Multiplying both sides by  $E_{it}$  and summing across the economies,

$$\tilde{\tau}_t = \sum_i E_{it} \tilde{\pi}_i^n + \sum_i E_{it} \frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} + \sum_i E_{it} \frac{d E_{it}}{E_{it}} + \sum_i E_{it} \tilde{\tau}_t;$$

$\sum_i E_{it} \frac{d E_{it}}{E_{it}} = 0$  due to normalization. Plugging back in,

$$E_{it} = \tilde{\pi}_i^n \tilde{\tau}_t \frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} + \sum_i E_{it} \frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} (\tilde{\tau}_t - \tilde{\tau}_t);$$

where  $\sum_i E_{it} \tilde{\pi}_i^n = \tilde{\tau}_t$  and  $\sum_i E_{it} \tilde{\tau}_t = \tilde{\tau}_t$ . Finally, suppose  $D_{it} = 1$ , or  $E_{it} = w_{it}$ .

Then,

$$\frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} b (E_{it} w_{it}) \text{ and } \sum_i E_{it} \frac{b \tilde{d}_t}{1 + b \tilde{d}_t} = 0;$$

Plugging in and solving out,

$$E_{it} = \frac{\tilde{\pi}_i^n \tilde{\tau}_t}{1 + b} + \frac{b w_{it}}{1 + b} + \frac{\theta_t}{1 + b};$$

## B Calibration Appendix

### B.1 Data

List of countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China , Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Portugal, Sweden, Taiwan, United States<sup>17</sup>.

List of sectors: Primary: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying. Manufacturing: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; Textile, Leather and Footwear; Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing; Coke, Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel; Chemicals and Chemical Products; Rubber and Plastics; Other Non-Metallic Mineral; Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal; Machinery; Electrical and Optical Equipment; Transport Equipment. Services: Manufacturing Nec, Recycling<sup>18</sup>, Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport and Storage; Post and Telecommunications; Financial Intermediation; Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities; Community Social and Personal.

Data cleaning . I do minimal cleaning of the dataset. First, as I am focusing on the long run processes, I smooth the data using a moving average of the series with a window length of 10 years. This removes the jumps in the data while keeping the long run trends intact. Second, I force no trade in the services sectors. While some services are tradable in practice, in WIOD services export values are not compiled from raw trade data and instead are imputed as a residual. Since these values are unlikely to

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17. I exclude Austria, Belgium, Hong Kong, Ireland and Netherlands from the analysis as the time series for these countries feature abnormalities. Austria and Netherlands series feature structural breaks in years 1995 and 1969 respectively. Hong Kong series show zero net or intermediate consumption of textiles, but positive production throughout the period. Belgium and Ireland do not show a clear structural break, but feature self-shares that dip down to zero for consecutive years absent a corresponding drop in sectoral sales. Since domestic sales in the dataset are obtained as a residual between output and exports, I interpret these observations as reflective of a measurement error in either the sales or the exports series.

18. Note: I include Manufacturing, Nec; Recycling into the services sector. This sector contains manufacturing of jewellery, musical instruments, games equipment, and toys; and recycling of metal- and non-metal scrap. Thus, this sector combines both manufacturing production, but also the provision of the service of recycling. I attribute it wholly to services.

match the true trade in services, I attribute all domestic absorption to domestic sales. Finally, the consumption reported in WIOD includes inventories and thus can take negative values. I subtract inventories from sectoral sales such that my measure of output is now akin to 'goods used'. This alteration leaves all other intermediate and final use categories intact and the dataset remains internally consistent.

Solving for paths of endogenous variables. Annual values for all endogenous variables can be derived as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 X_{ijk} &= X_{ijk}^{FC} + \sum_n X_{ijnk}^{II}; & Y_{ik} &= \sum_j X_{jik}; & p_{ijk} &= \frac{P_j X_{ijk}}{\sum_l X_{ilk}}; \\
 p_{ikn} &= \frac{P_j X_{ijnk}^{II}}{Y_{ik}}; & p_{ikl} &= 1 - \sum_n p_{ikn}; & E_i &= \sum_{j;k} X_{ijk}^{FC} = L_i; & p_{ik} &= \frac{P_j X_{ijk}^{FC}}{L_i E_i};
 \end{aligned}$$

## B.2 Calibration of Parameter $\beta$

In the changes formulation of the model, the relationship between the change in the total expenditure and the changes in income is defined implicitly:

$$\hat{E}_{it} = \hat{\alpha}_{it} \frac{1}{1 + \beta d_{it}} \frac{1 + \beta d_{it}}{1 + \beta d_{it}} \frac{1}{\hat{\alpha}_{it}}; \quad [EE]$$

where  $\hat{\alpha}_{it} = \frac{P_j X_{ijnk}^{II}}{Y_{ik}}$ ,  $d_{it} = \frac{E_{it} w_i}{w_i}$ , and  $\hat{d}_{it} = \frac{E_{it} \hat{E}_{it}}{w_{it} \hat{w}_{it}} - 1 - \frac{1}{d_{it}}$ .  $\beta$  is calibrated as follows:

1. Back out  $\hat{\alpha}_{it+1}$  using the normalization  $\sum_i \hat{\alpha}_{it+1} = 1$ .
2. Plug in  $\hat{\alpha}_{it+1}$ , as well as  $\hat{w}_{it}$ ,  $E_{it}$  and  $w_i$  as observed in the data, into equation EE.
3. Impose  $\hat{\alpha}_{it} = 1$   $\forall i, t \in T$ .

4. Search over  $\theta$  as to minimize

$$\sum_{i;t} (\hat{E}_{it} - \hat{E}_{it}^*)^2;$$

where  $\hat{E}_{it}$  is the change in household expenditure in the data and  $\hat{E}_{it}^*$  is the solution to EE under restrictions imposed in steps 1-3.

### B.3 Calibration of Exogenous Shocks

The model is calibrated by inverting the equilibrium conditions in Appendix C.2 as follows:

1. Construct changes in wages from observed changes in GDP and population:

$$\hat{w}_i = \hat{Y}_i - \hat{L}_i.$$

2. Normalize  $\hat{\alpha}_{iM} = \hat{\alpha}_{ikM} = 1$  and  $\hat{Q}_i = 1$ .

3. Use observed  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikl}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikn}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ik}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikl}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikn}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ik}$  and  $\hat{E}_i$ , as well as sectoral price changes  $\hat{P}_{ik}$  obtained in Section 4.4 to solve [iii] [vi] and [x] in Appendix C.2 for the full set of  $\hat{\alpha}_i$ ;  $\hat{\alpha}_{ik}$ ,  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikl}$  and  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikn}$  for all  $i \in I$  and  $k; n \in K$ .

4. Use  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikl}$  and  $\hat{\alpha}_{ikn}$  series as well as wage changes  $\hat{w}_i$  to solve for input costs  $\hat{c}_{ik}$ .

5. Use input costs  $\hat{c}_{ik}$ , price changes  $\hat{P}_{ik}$  and observed changes in trade shares  $\hat{\alpha}_{ijk}$  to solve for sectoral productivity and trade cost shocks  $\hat{\alpha}_{ik}$  and  $\hat{\alpha}_{ijk}$  for all  $i; j \in I$  and  $k \in K$ .

### B.4 Switching Countries O

In Section 6 I conduct a series of exercises which involve 'switching o' of individual economies. I do so as follows. Let the country to be switched o be indexed First, I let all exogenous shock series for economies other than o evolve as estimated in

Section 4.4. Second, all shock series relating to other than sectoral productivities and discount factor shocks, are set to no-change  $\hat{a}_{jkt} = \hat{a}_{jikt} = \hat{a}_{ikt} = \hat{a}_{iknt} = \hat{a}_{ikLt} = \hat{a}_{it} = 1$  for all  $j, k, n$  and  $t$ . Third, sectoral productivity and discount factor shocks are set such that expenditure and sectoral value added remain unchanged. This ensures that changes in global international markets do not induce to borrow or lend and that there is no spurious specialization<sup>19</sup>. Finally, I replace the per-period utility function and production functions for  $i$  by appropriately re-calibrated Cobb-Douglas functions. This is necessary since even absent the evolution of own exogenous variables, as long as  $i$  is open, evolving productivities elsewhere in the world result in changes in sectoral prices and therefore changes in sectoral expenditures and wages in  $i$ . The outcome of this specification is the economy 'frozen in time' at the level of the initial year  $t$ . Changes in sectoral shares in all other economies in this specification register the evolution in sectoral composition that would have occurred had  $i$  remained static in terms of both its exogenous processes and its endogenous outcomes. In turn, the difference between the 'o' specification and the data is the isolated effect of  $i$  on the global economies. I refer to this difference as  $\hat{\delta}^i$ . Note that this difference captures the contribution of individual exogenous series in  $i$ , as well as of the interactions between them. Finally, observe that  $\hat{\delta}^i$  can be partially switched back on by bringing shock series into baseline, one at a time. The difference between this specification and  $\hat{\delta}^i$  isolates the effect of the given shock series.

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19. In the model, it is not the level of  $\hat{a}$  that determines borrowing, but its relative size relative to that of the other economies. Thus, setting  $\hat{a} = 1$  is not sufficient to preclude  $i$  from borrowing. Likewise, setting  $\hat{A}_{ikt} = 1$  does not preclude specialization: when all other countries' productivities evolve, no change in  $i$ 's productivity still entails evolution in relative productivities, and therefore, in comparative advantage of  $i$ .

## C Online Appendix

### C.1 Derivations of the Equilibrium Conditions

Equilibrium. Eaton and Kortum (2002) show that if Assumption 1 holds, then sector-level price indices and expenditures can be solved for in closed form. Together with intertemporal optimization of households, this yields the following set of equilibrium conditions (see derivations in Appendix C.1).

Trade shares, that is the expenditures on imports from any given destination as a share of the total spending on the sectoral bundle, satisfy:

$$t_{jik} = \frac{c_{jk}^{ik}}{A_{jk} P_{jk}^k}; \quad \text{where } P_{ik} = \left( \sum_l \frac{c_{lk}^{ik}}{A_{lk}} \right)^{\frac{1}{k}} \quad (21)$$

is the price of the sectoral bundle in country  $i$ , and  $c_{ik}$  is the cost of production of a firm in  $i$ ;  $k$  with a unit productivity

$$c_{ik} = w_{ik}^{1-ikl} \left( \sum_s \frac{c_{iks}^{ikl}}{P_{iks}^{1-s}} \right)^{\frac{1-ikl}{s}}; \quad (22)$$

where  $P_{ikP} = P_{iP}$ ,  $P_{ikM} = \left( \sum_m \frac{c_{ikm}^{ikl}}{P_{ikm}^{1-m}} \right)^{1-(1-m)}$  and  $P_{ikS} = P_{iS}$ .

Firms optimally spend a fraction  $ikl$  of their revenue on labor:

$$ikl = \frac{w_i l_{ik}(z)}{p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z)} = \frac{ikl}{ikl}; \quad (23)$$

and a fraction  $\alpha_{ikn}$  of their revenue on inputs from sector:

$$\alpha_{ikn} = \frac{P_{in} m_{ikn}(z)}{P_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z)} = \begin{cases} (1 - \alpha_{ikl}) \frac{P_{iP}^1 P_{iP}^1 P_{iP}^1}{P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1}; & \text{if } n = 1 \\ (1 - \alpha_{ikl}) \frac{P_{iM}^1 P_{iM}^1 P_{iM}^1}{P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1} \frac{P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1}{P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1}; & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ (1 - \alpha_{ikl}) \frac{P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1}{P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1 P_{iS}^1}; & \text{if } n = K; \end{cases} \quad (24)$$

Household sectoral expenditure shares depend on prices, per-period aggregate consumption  $C_i$ , and household expenditure  $E_i = \sum_{k=2}^K P_{ik} C_{ik}$ :

$$\alpha_{in} = \frac{P_{in} C_{in}}{E_i} = \begin{cases} \frac{P_{iP}}{E_i} C_i^{(1-s)P}; & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \frac{P_{iM}}{E_i} C_i^{(1-s)M} \frac{P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1}{P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1}; & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ \frac{P_{iS}}{E_i} C_i^{(1-s)S}; & \text{if } n = K; \end{cases} \quad (25)$$

where  $C_i$  is defined implicitly:

$$\sum_s \frac{1}{P_{iS}} \frac{C_{iS}}{C_i^s} = 1; \quad \text{with } C_{iP} = \frac{P_{iP} E_i}{P_{iP}}; \quad C_{iM} = \frac{P_{iM} E_i}{P_{iM}}; \quad C_{iS} = \frac{P_{iS} E_i}{P_{iS}};$$

and where manufacturing consumption bundle price  $P_{iM}$  satisfies

$$P_{iM} = \sum_m P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1 P_{im}^1; \quad \text{! } 1=(1-m)$$

Household consumption smoothing problem gives rise to the following Euler condition:

$$\frac{E_{it}}{E_{it-1}} = \frac{1 + b d_{it}}{1 + b d_{it-1}} \frac{E_{it}}{E_{it-1}}; \quad \text{where } d_{it} = \frac{E_{it}}{W_i} \text{ and } E_{it} = \sum_s P_{is} C_{is}; \quad (26)$$

Sectoral bundle market clearing in  $i, k$  satisfies

$$X_{ik} = L_i E_i + \int_{n \in K} \int_0^1 p_{in}(z) y_{in}(z) dz = L_i E_i + \int_{n \in K} Y_{in}; \quad (27)$$

where  $Y_{ik}$  denotes the sales of all varieties in  $k$ :  $Y_{ik} = \int_0^1 p_{in}(z) y_{in}(z) dz$ .

Sectoral sales are a sum of what is demanded by each trading partner:

$$Y_{ik} = \sum_j X_{jk}; \quad (28)$$

Labour market clears

$$w L_i = \int_{k \in K} \int_0^1 w_{ik}(z) dz = \int_{k \in K} L_{ik} Y_{ik}; \quad (29)$$

Finally, bond market clearing together with normalization require

$$\sum_i L_{it} E_{it} = \sum_i L_{it} w_{it} = 1; \quad (30)$$

Trade shares. The setup of international trade follows directly from Eaton and Kortum (2002). Since the proof is lengthy, and not new to this paper, I present the stylised argument and refer the reader to detailed proofs in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Eaton et al. (2016).

Perfect competition in production of varieties ensures that each variety can be offered at most at its marginal cost. Taking transportation costs into account, the price of receiving in  $i$  a unit of variety  $z$  from  $j$  would be

$$p_{ijk}(z) = \frac{c_{jk}^{ijk}}{a_{jk}(z)};$$

Since bundle producer views varieties produced anywhere as perfectly substitutable,



the price it pays is the minimal of prices by origin:

$$p_{ik}(z) = \min_i \frac{c_{jk}^{ijk}}{a_{jk}(z)} :$$

CES production function of the bundle producer results in the following price of a bundle:

$$P_{ik} = \int_0^Z p_{ik}(z)^{1-\sigma} dz^{\sigma} :$$

Assumption 1 ensures that aggregation over varieties gives rise to trade shares in (21).

Firm problem. Consider the following maximization,

$$\max_{l(z)_{ik}; m_{ikn}(z)} y_{ik}(z) = p_{ik}(z) a_{ik}(z) \frac{l_{ik}(z)^{1-\sigma_{ikl}}}{1-\sigma_{ikl}} \frac{m_{ik}(z)^{1-\sigma_{ikm}}}{1-\sigma_{ikm}} w_i l_{ik}(z) \prod_{n=2}^K P_{in} m_{ikn}(z);$$

where

$$m_{ik}(z) = \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikP}} m_{ikP}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikP}-1}{\sigma_{ikP}}} + \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikM}} \prod_m \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikm}} m_{ikm}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikm}-1}{\sigma_{ikm}}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma_{ikM}(\sigma_{ikP}-1)}{\sigma_{ikP}(\sigma_{ikM}-1)}} + \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikS}} m_{ikS}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikS}-1}{\sigma_{ikS}}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\sigma_{ik}}} A :$$

First order conditions with respect to inputs are as follows:

$$FOC_{l(z)_{ik}} : \sigma_{ikl} p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z) = w_i l_{ik}(z);$$

$$FOC_{m_{ikP}(z)} : (1 - \sigma_{ikl}) p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z) \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikP}} \frac{m_{ikP}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikP}-1}{\sigma_{ikP}}}}{m_{ik}(z)} = m_{ikM}(z) P_{iP};$$

$$FOC_{m_{ikm}(z)} : (1 - \sigma_{ikl}) p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z) \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikM}} \frac{m_{ikM}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikM}-1}{\sigma_{ikM}}}}{m_{ik}(z)} \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikm}} \frac{m_{ikm}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikm}-1}{\sigma_{ikm}}}}{m_{ikM}(z)} = m_{ikm}(z) P_{im};$$

$$FOC_{m_{ikS}(z)} : (1 - \sigma_{ikl}) p_{ik}(z) y_{ik}(z) \frac{1}{\sigma_{ikS}} \frac{m_{ikS}(z)^{\frac{\sigma_{ikS}-1}{\sigma_{ikS}}}}{m_{ik}(z)} = m_{ikS}(z) P_{iS};$$

The unit cost of production (22) obtains by combining these first order conditions with intermediate input cost function and production function defined in (1)-(3).

The input expenditure shares (23) and (24) obtain by combining these first order conditions with intermediate input cost function, production function defined in (1) (3), and by defining appropriate price indices.

Household problem. Household problem can be solved in two steps. First, for a given expenditure  $E_i$ , solve

$$\max_{C_{ik}} C_i; \quad \text{where} \quad \sum_s \frac{1}{i^s} \frac{C_{is}}{C_i^s} = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad C_{iM} = \sum_m \frac{1}{i^m} C_{im}^{\frac{1}{m}} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_k P_{ik} C_{ik} = E_i;$$

First order conditions with respect to sectoral consumption are as follows:

$$\text{FOC}_{C_{iP}} : \frac{dC_i}{dC_{iP}} = \frac{1}{i^P} \frac{C_{iP}}{C_i^s} \sum_s \frac{1}{i^s} \frac{C_{is}}{C_i^s} = \lambda_i \frac{C_i}{C_{iP}} = \lambda_i P_{iP}; \\ \text{FOC}_{C_{im}} : \frac{dC_i}{dC_{im}} = \frac{1}{i^m} \frac{C_{im}}{C_i^s} \sum_s \frac{1}{i^s} \frac{C_{is}}{C_i^s} = \lambda_i \frac{C_i}{C_{im}} \frac{1}{i^m} \frac{C_{im}}{C_{im}} = \lambda_i P_{im}; \\ \text{FOC}_{C_{iS}} : \frac{dC_i}{dC_{iS}} = \frac{1}{i^S} \frac{C_{iS}}{C_i^s} \sum_s \frac{1}{i^s} \frac{C_{is}}{C_i^s} = \lambda_i \frac{C_i}{C_{iS}} = \lambda_i P_{iS};$$

where  $\lambda_i$  is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint. Final consumption expenditure shares in (25) obtain by substituting expenditures from these first order conditions into the budget constraint to solve for  $\lambda_i$ , and then plugging  $\lambda_i$  back in.

Next, consider the following intertemporal problem:

$$\max_{E_{it}; B_{it+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln C_{it}(E_{it}; P_{it}) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad E_{it} + \beta_{t+1} B_{it+1} + \frac{b}{2} \frac{E_{it} w_i}{w_i} = w_i + B_{it} + T_{it};$$

where  $P_{it}$  is a vector of prices faced at  $t$ .

$$FOC_{E_{it}} : \quad \lambda_{it} \frac{1}{C_{it}} \frac{dC_{it}}{dE_{it}} = \lambda_{it} (1 + b_{it});$$

$$FOC_{B_{it+1}} : \quad \lambda_{it} = \lambda_{it+1};$$

where  $d_{it} = \frac{E_{it} w_i}{W_i}$  and where  $\lambda_{it}$  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint in period  $t$ . Optimality conditions obtained in the previous segment can be used to derive

$$\frac{1}{C_{it}} \frac{dC_{it}}{dE_{it}} = \sum_s \lambda_{it} \frac{dX_{ist}}{dE_{it}} :$$

Plugging in and substituting for  $\lambda_{it}$  and  $\lambda_{it+1}$  gives rise to the Euler equation (26).

## C.2 Model in Changes

Suppose that base year values of endogenous variables  $Y_{ijk}, Y_{ik}, Y_{ikl}, Y_{ikn}, E_i, w_i, L_i$  for all  $i; j \geq 1$  and  $k; n \geq K$ , are known. Equations [i] to [x] constitute the equilibrium of the changes formulation of the model and can be used to solve for all the endogenous objects in the next period as a function of the exogenous shocks:

[i] Changes in trade shares and price indices can be derived from conditions (21):

$$\hat{\alpha}_{jik} = \frac{\hat{Q}_k \hat{\alpha}_{jik}}{\hat{A}_{ik} \hat{P}_{jk}} ; \quad \hat{P}_{ik} = \sum_l \hat{Q}_k \hat{\alpha}_{ilk} \frac{1}{\hat{A}_{lk}} :$$

[ii] Changes in production costs can be derived from (22):

$$\hat{Q}_k = w_{ik}^{ikl} \sum_s \frac{P_{iks}}{P_{iks}} \lambda_{iks} \hat{P}_{iks}^{1-\frac{1}{s}} ;$$

$$\text{where } \hat{P}_{ikP} = \hat{P}_{iP}, \hat{P}_{ikM} = \sum_m \frac{P_{ikm}}{P_{ikm}} \lambda_{ikm} \hat{P}_{im}^{1-(1-\theta_m)} \text{ and } \hat{P}_{ikS} = \hat{P}_{iS}.$$

[iii] Changes in labour shares are immediate from (23)  $\hat{\lambda}_{ikl} = \hat{\lambda}_{ikl}$  :

[iv] Changes in intermediate input shares can be derived from (24):

$$\hat{\lambda}_{ikn} = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{1} \frac{\lambda_{ikl}}{\lambda_{ikl}} \frac{\lambda_{ikP} \beta_{ikP}^1}{\beta_{ikP}^1} \frac{\beta_{iks}^1}{\beta_{iks}^1} & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \frac{1}{1} \frac{\lambda_{ikl}}{\lambda_{ikl}} \frac{\lambda_{ikM} \beta_{ikM}^1}{\beta_{ikM}^1} \frac{\beta_{iks}^1}{\beta_{iks}^1} \frac{\lambda_{ikm} \beta_{ikm}^1}{\beta_{ikm}^1} & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ \frac{1}{1} \frac{\lambda_{ikl}}{\lambda_{ikl}} \frac{\lambda_{ikS} \beta_{ikS}^1}{\beta_{ikS}^1} & \text{if } n = K \end{cases}$$

[v] Changes in the final expenditure shares can be derived from condition (25):

$$\hat{\lambda}_{in} = \begin{cases} \hat{\lambda}_{iP} \frac{\beta_{iP}^1}{\beta_{iP}^1} \beta_{iP}^{(1-s)} & \text{if } n = 1 \\ \hat{\lambda}_{iM} \frac{\beta_{iM}^1}{\beta_{iM}^1} \beta_{iM}^{(1-s)} \frac{\lambda_{im} \beta_{im}^1}{\beta_{im}^1} & \text{if } 1 < n < K \\ \hat{\lambda}_{iS} \frac{\beta_{iS}^1}{\beta_{iS}^1} \beta_{iS}^{(1-s)} & \text{if } n = K \end{cases}$$

where  $\beta_{iP}$  satisfies:

$$\sum_s \lambda_{is} \frac{\beta_{is}^1}{\beta_{is}^1} \beta_{is}^{(1-s)} = 1:$$

[vi] Changes in household expenditure can be derived from (26):

$$\hat{E}_{it} = \hat{\lambda}_{it} \frac{1}{t+1} \frac{1 + b d_{it}}{1 + b d_{it} \hat{d}_{it}} \hat{\lambda}_{it}^{-1};$$

$$\text{where } \hat{\lambda}_{it} = \frac{P}{\beta_{ist}^1} \frac{\lambda_{ist}^1}{\beta_{ist}^1}, d_{it} = \frac{E_{it} w_i}{w_i}, \text{ and } \hat{d}_{it} = \frac{E_{it} \hat{E}_{it}}{w_{it} w_{it}} \frac{1}{d_{it}}.$$

[vii]  $\hat{X}_{ik}$  satisfies the sectoral bundle market clearing condition (27):

$$X_{ik} \hat{X}_{ik} = L_i E_i \hat{L}_{ik} \hat{E}_i + \sum_{n=2}^K Y_{in} \hat{Y}_{in} \hat{\Phi}_{in} :$$

[viii]  $\hat{Y}_{ik}$  satisfies the sectoral market clearing condition (28)  $Y_{ik} \hat{Y}_{ik} = \sum_j P_{jik} X_{jk} \hat{X}_{jk} :$

[ix] Wages change as to clear the labor market (29)  $w_i L_i \hat{w}_i \hat{L}_i = \sum_{k=2}^K Y_{ik} \hat{Y}_{ik} \hat{\Phi}_{ik} :$

[x] Finally,  $\hat{L}_{t+1}$  satisfies (30):  $\sum_i L_{it} \hat{L}_{it} E_{it} \hat{E}_{it} = 1 :$

### C.3 Shock Summary Statistics

	Primary	Food	Textiles	Pulp & Paper	Coke & Petroleum	Chemicals	Rubber & Plastics	Non-Metallic Mineral	Basic/Fabricated Metal	Machinery, Nec	Electrical & Optical	Transport Equipment	Services	Total
Australia	0.71	0.91	0.88	0.75	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.69	0.75	0.72	0.78	0.79	NaN	0.76
Brazil	0.75	0.77	0.60	0.43	0.42	0.64	0.44	0.51	0.64	0.60	0.66	0.61	NaN	0.63
Canada	0.90	0.79	0.79	0.84	0.57	0.74	0.81	0.76	0.93	0.76	0.80	0.80	NaN	0.82
China	0.58	0.68	0.61	0.50	0.29	0.53	0.46	0.24	0.62	0.41	0.51	0.53	NaN	0.54
Germany	0.80	0.68	0.69	0.70	0.84	0.68	0.72	0.81	0.72	0.79	0.82	0.86	NaN	0.76
Denmark	0.91	0.74	0.65	0.75	0.60	0.68	0.68	0.71	0.80	0.76	0.80	0.77	NaN	0.77
Spain	0.72	0.73	0.58	0.69	0.43	0.65	0.52	0.61	0.64	0.76	0.73	0.61	NaN	0.65
Finland	0.61	0.74	0.70	0.79	0.51	0.67	0.60	0.60	0.75	0.81	0.75	0.81	NaN	0.71
France	0.80	0.76	0.72	0.84	0.60	0.67	0.76	0.82	0.87	0.83	0.81	0.81	NaN	0.78
United Kingdom	0.78	0.80	0.74	0.92	0.58	0.65	0.68	0.78	0.85	0.80	0.78	0.77	NaN	0.78
Greece	0.68	0.80	0.70	0.84	0.57	0.67	0.82	0.76	0.85	0.69	0.77	0.68	NaN	0.72
India	0.59	0.69	0.71	0.78	0.40	0.60	0.52	0.55	0.60	0.70	0.67	0.61	NaN	0.62
Italy	0.74	0.73	0.76	0.78	0.66	0.71	0.71	0.78	0.79	0.81	0.86	0.82	NaN	0.76
Japan	0.82	1.03	0.86	0.79	0.68	0.83	0.64	0.72	0.86	0.80	0.81	0.74	NaN	0.82
Republic of Korea	0.57	0.61	0.73	0.54	0.42	0.52	0.39	0.41	0.63	0.55	0.64	0.56	NaN	0.58
Mexico	0.60	0.81	0.68	0.59	0.42	0.71	0.36	0.81	0.68	0.64	0.59	0.56	NaN	0.64
Portugal	0.75	0.75	0.64	0.64	0.65	0.70	0.55	0.50	0.70	0.67	0.73	0.64	NaN	0.68
Sweden	0.73	0.76	0.69	0.85	0.63	0.72	0.75	0.77	0.91	0.86	0.82	0.95	NaN	0.82
Taiwan	0.52	0.79	0.57	0.44	0.50	0.59	0.43	0.44	0.57	0.72	0.67	0.71	NaN	0.56
United States	0.84	0.97	0.73	0.94	0.94	0.70	0.78	0.77	0.93	0.84	0.82	0.89	NaN	0.87
RoW	0.86	0.83	0.73	0.79	0.76	0.70	0.75	0.78	0.80	0.77	0.77	0.82	NaN	0.81

Table C.1: Inward Trade Cost Shocks, 1965-2011

Note: Trade costs are computed by first obtaining an import-share weighted average inward trade cost shock, and then multiplying these over time to obtain change over the whole period. The total is computed by first obtaining yearly tradable sector sales-share weighted average inward trade cost shocks, and then multiplying these over time to obtain change over the whole period.

	Primary	Food	Textiles	Pulp & Paper	Coke & Petroleum	Chemicals	Rubber & Plastics	Non-Metallic Mineral	Basic/Fabricated Metal	Machinery, Nec	Electrical & Optical	Transport Equipment	Services	Total
Australia	2.37	1.29	1.97	2.71	0.75	1.44	1.95	2.61	7.00	7.61	1.34	1.61	1.39	1.65
Brazil	3.92	1.89	3.11	4.68	1.00	1.83	3.20	3.43	9.73	9.40	1.71	1.78	2.39	2.59
Canada	2.15	1.37	1.90	1.79	0.77	1.20	1.98	1.79	5.48	7.27	1.10	1.53	1.36	1.54
China	3.58	1.96	2.00	2.68	1.52	1.69	2.93	2.90	7.80	7.80	1.19	1.43	1.36	2.20
Germany	2.13	1.70	1.93	2.27	0.66	1.33	2.34	2.21	6.65	7.85	1.83	1.75	1.93	2.12
Denmark	2.69	1.32	1.78	2.32	0.82	1.46	2.32	2.45	9.08	9.09	1.77	1.24	1.78	1.95
Spain	3.63	1.60	2.17	2.56	0.78	1.78	2.57	3.09	7.61	7.94	1.46	1.52	2.03	2.25
Finland	3.02	1.58	2.61	1.99	1.62	1.78	3.17	2.95	6.24	9.69	2.37	1.46	1.76	2.14
France	2.15	1.46	1.81	1.98	0.57	1.17	2.09	1.84	6.25	7.34	1.35	1.37	1.67	1.76
United Kingdom	2.94	1.50	1.88	2.03	0.52	1.13	1.74	1.72	6.16	6.75	1.34	1.37	1.58	1.75
Greece	2.79	1.39	2.23	2.21	1.11	1.41	2.10	2.28	5.22	7.87	0.69	2.36	1.74	1.93
India	2.72	1.53	1.75	2.00	1.35	1.40	2.14	2.29	5.87	6.14	0.92	1.35	1.16	1.68
Italy	2.83	1.64	2.29	2.16	0.52	1.31	2.03	2.31	7.70	6.85	1.59	1.38	1.78	2.02
Japan	3.63	2.04	2.35	2.09	1.22	1.75	2.56	2.06	5.94	8.62	1.82	1.81	2.56	2.52
Republic of Korea	8.76	1.72	2.67	3.73	1.68	2.92	3.93	5.12	6.36	15.7	2.39	3.03	4.08	3.93
Mexico	2.42	1.37	1.73	1.79	0.72	1.00	1.89	2.05	5.03	6.50	1.11	1.68	1.20	1.46
Portugal	3.72	1.51	2.25	3.10	1.24	1.59	3.59	3.21	7.58	7.64	1.47	1.33	2.16	2.34
Sweden	2.19	1.52	1.72	1.74	0.86	1.63	2.05	1.77	5.93	6.53	1.40	1.61	1.32	1.59
Taiwan	3.83	1.58	2.41	3.49	1.83	1.88	2.28	3.52	6.68	7.59	1.70	2.38	3.29	2.89
United States	1.67	1.25	1.64	1.52	0.60	1.15	1.58	1.44	5.44	6.00	1.27	1.18	1.26	1.38
RoW	2.69	1.56	2.08	2.31	0.73	1.44	2.09	2.41	7.27	7.84	1.47	1.62	1.48	1.79

Table C.2: Sectoral Productivity Shocks, 1965-2011

*Note:* Sectoral productivities are obtained by multiplying yearly changes over time to obtain change over the whole period. The total is computed by first obtaining yearly sectoral sales-share weighted average change in productivity, and then multiplying these over time to obtain change over the whole period.

## C.4 Additional Figures




Figure C.1: Mechanisms of Manufacturing Value Added Shares by Shock

*Note:* The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 1965 and 2011. The bars correspond to the components of decompositions [1] in Panel (a) and [20] in Panels (b)–(d).






Figure C.2: Mechanisms of Structural Change within Manufacturing

*Note:* The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 1965 and 2011. The bars correspond to the components of decomposition [1].




Figure C.3: China-driven De-industrialization by Industry

*Note:* The crosses mark the change in the manufacturing value added share between 2000 and 2011. The yellow bars represent the value added changes in the simulation with all non-China shocks unconstrained, and China shocks calibrated such that  $\hat{y}_{ikt} = \hat{j}_{ikt} = \hat{\Omega}_{ikt} = \hat{I}_{ikt} = \hat{I}_{kLt} = \hat{L}_{jt} = 1$  for all  $j \geq 1, k; n \geq K$  and  $t \geq T$ , where  $i$  indexes China. Additionally,  $\hat{I}_{ikt}$  and  $\hat{A}_{ikt}$  for China is calibrated so that there is no change in China's expenditure and sectoral value added. The red bars depict the difference between this calibration and the simulation subject to baseline calibration.

